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ABSTRACT: 
 
 
What are the implications of second-strike nuclear forces for neorealism? The end of the Cold 
War yielded a unipolar structure of international politics defined by the military, economic, 
and political preponderance of the United States. According to balance-of-power theory, 
which lies at the heart of neorealism, unipolarity has a short life span as secondary states 
waste little time in rectifying the global imbalance of power. Thus far, America remains 
unbalanced. Are we to take this as a refutation of balance-of-power theory? My thesis argues 
that second-strike arsenals render void the need to balance superior American military power. 
But because state survival is contingent not only upon military invulnerability (for which 
nuclear weapons are a sure guarantee), but also upon economic invulnerability (for which 
there is no absolute remedy), nuclear-weapon states are impelled to balance superior 
economic power for security reasons. By recasting balance-of-power theory in light of these 
assumptions, one can make sense of the great-power politics of the post-Cold War era.     
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Balance-of-power theory, central to neorealism1, is here subjected to a unit-level challenge: 
nuclear weapons. Specifically, what are the implications of second-strike nuclear forces for 
balance-of-power theory in the post-Cold War era? Balance-of-power theory is derived from 
neorealism, itself a systems-theory of international politics. Its systemic nature implies the 
predominance of structure over agency, or systems-level causes over unit-level causes, in 
explaining the outcomes of state behaviour. Nuclear weapons, properly viewed, are a unit-
level variable.2 In neorealist theory, unit-level forces do not assume major causal importance. 
In the present context, however, it is argued that nuclear weapons impact importantly upon 
the structure of the international system, and thus have important implications for balance-of-
power theory. Hence, the analysis undertaken herein investigates the nexus between balance-
of-power theory and nuclear weapons, a little-explored issue in international relations theory.3   
The demise of the Soviet Union transformed the international system’s structure from 
one of bipolarity to one of unipolarity. And American unipolarity, in balance-of-power 
theory, is expected to be relatively short-lived, as secondary states work to rectify the global 
imbalance of power. Thus far, this expectation has not been borne out, at least not in the 
manner intended by most proponents of balance-of-power theory. In particular, the thesis asks 
why no significant efforts have been undertaken by the secondary states to balance the United 
States militarily, considering that such a military balance of power is within their reach? My 
argument confronts this dilemma, and posits that second-strike nuclear forces obviate the 
need for nuclear-weapon states to balance superior military power. Because state survival can 
                                            
1 Neorealism is developed in Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1979. 
Balance-of-power theory henceforth denotes Waltz’s formulation of the theory. 
2 As Waltz writes, referring to nuclear weapons, “a change of military technology” represents “a change at the 
unit level”. Quoted in Kenneth Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, vol. 18, no. 4, 1988, p. 626  
3 Cf. Steve Weber, “Realism, Detente, and Nuclear Weapons,” International Organization, vol. 44, no. 1, 1990, 
p. 59 for an important, and self-acknowledged, exception. 
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be threatened economically, I show that balancing among nuclear-weapon states is channelled 
away from the military realm and into the economic realm of international politics.  
The thesis therefore sets itself four tasks, each of which constitutes a separate chapter. 
Hence chapter 1 examines and assesses existing statements of balance-of-power theory in the 
context of post-Cold War unipolarity. Critical attention is then directed toward the more 
recent neorealist scholarship that has sought to fine-tune Kenneth Waltz’s parsimonious 
theory, and asks whether these theoretical efforts constitute an improvement over Waltz’s 
original theory. Because on the whole they do not, the path is paved for Waltz’s sparse theory 
to serve as the subject of my investigation. Next, chapter 2 analyses the impact of nuclear 
weapons upon the assumptions of balance-of-power theory. The argument in this chapter 
forms the theoretical bedrock upon which the remainder of the thesis rests. It asserts that 
minimum deterrent arsenals are sufficient to render void any further balancing of superior 
military power, conventional or nuclear. By first laying down the case for minimum 
deterrence, the chapter surveys and critiques the opposing schools of thought in the nuclear 
deterrence debate. Chapter 3 explores balancing behaviour among nuclear-weapon states. The 
argument in this chapter finds that, other than military power, only one dimension of power 
can be wielded by other states to jeopardize a state’s prospects of survival: economic power. 
And unlike military vulnerability, for which nuclear weapons provide an absolute remedy, no 
such solution is available for states to confront economic vulnerability. Hence the need to 
balance economic power for reasons of survival. Subsequently, chapter 4 advances and tests 
the hypothesis that, despite nuclear weaponry’s negation of military balancing among the 
great powers, the latter have been actively engaged in balancing America’s preponderant 
economic power. An evaluation of neorealism’s explanatory power in the post-Cold War era 
concludes the thesis.      
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I. BALANCE-OF-POWER THEORY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
In observing a disjunction between unit-level causes and their international effects, Kenneth 
Waltz concluded that state attributes do not correlate with the outcomes of state behaviour.4 
This led Waltz, the founder of neorealism, to believe that a constraining force interposed 
between cause and effect, namely, the structure of the international system. A brief 
consideration of Waltzian structuralism is therefore warranted. Waltz advances a threefold 
definition of the structure of the international system: (1) the system’s anarchic organizing 
principle; (2) the functional differentiation of the system’s units; and (3) the distribution of 
capabilities5 within the system.6 In an anarchic realm, states seeking at a minimum to survive 
must tend to their own security, since no agent can be counted upon to do so on their behalf. 
John Mearsheimer, paraphrasing the Protestant work ethic, captures the logic of this self-help 
system: “In international politics, God helps those who help themselves.”7 Through self-help, 
states become ‘like units’; they are each compelled to perform the same vital functions 
required to sustain themselves as viable political entities. Given this functional non-
differentiation among the system’s units, the second definition of structure “drops out”.8 
Thus, Waltz argues, states’ relative power positions within the anarchic international system 
tell us much about their likely behaviour.  
If theories explain laws, and laws are associations that hold repeatedly, then theories 
explain continuities.9 Continuities abound in international politics: war and the formation of 
balances of power are two major such cases that have been addressed by neorealist theory.10 
                                            
4 Waltz, 1979, ch. 4 
5 Capabilities in neorealist theory are broadly defined, as are the “elements of national power” in classical 
realism. Cf Part 3 of Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Knopf, 
New York, 1948. Waltz’s definition of capabilities includes: size of population, territory, resource endowment, 
economic capacity, political stability, and political competence. Waltz, 1979, p. 131      
6 Waltz, 1979, ch. 5 
7 Quoted in John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton and Co., 2001, p. 33 
8 Waltz, 1979, p. 101 
9 Waltz, 1979, ch. 1 
10 The recurrence of war is dealt with in Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, 2nd ed. 
rev., Columbia University Press, New York, 2001 (1959). For a treatment of the recurrence of war in explicitly 
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It is with the latter that we are here concerned. François Fénelon, a seventeenth-century 
French theologian, is reputed to have been the first to identify the recurrence of balances of 
power as a law-like association, and not merely the result of intentional statecraft.11 Waltz 
writes: “If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power 
theory is it.”12 The reasoning is as follows: “states, if they are free to choose, flock to the 
weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them”.13 Balancing behaviour can take 
two forms: internal and external balancing.14 The former is achieved through measures 
internal to the state, for instance arms build-ups, the promotion of economic growth, the 
contriving of clever strategies, etc. The latter is achieved through measures external to the 
state, namely alliances of stronger or lesser degrees. Which variety of balancing is most 
prominent depends not only upon the configuration of the international system, of which there 
are three types - uni-, bi-, and multipolarity - but also upon the power disparities within those 
configurations.15 For instance, superpower balancing in the bipolar world of the Cold War 
(1945-1990) was primarily of an internal nature, seeing as the relatively weak allies added 
little to either superpower’s relative power.16 
                                                                                                                                       
While systems-level causes (anarchy and the distribution of capabilities) in neorealism 
“shape and shove”, they do not determine state behaviour.17 This indeterminacy is explained 
 
neorealist terms, see Kenneth Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, vol. 18, no. 4, 1988. The recurrence of balances of power is dealt with in Waltz, 1979. 
11 Fred Halliday, Justin Rosenberg, & Kenneth Waltz, “Interview with Ken Waltz,” Review of International 
Studies, vol. 24, 1998, p. 382 
12 Quoted in Waltz, 1979, p. 117 
13 Quoted in ibid, 1979, p. 127 
14 Waltz, 1979, ch. 6 
15 Wohlforth, for instance, argues that in the present unipolar world, the power disparity between the United 
States and the rest of the world is unprecedented in international history. Such a power gap makes both internal 
and external forms of balancing useless and even counterproductive. William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a 
Unipolar World,” International Security, vol. 24, no. 1, 1999   
16 Waltz, 1979, ch. 8  
17 Quoted in Kenneth Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in 
Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p. 343. Fareed 
Zakaria makes this mistake in his “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” in Michael Brown, Sean 
Lynn-Jones, & Steven Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 465, when he states that “systemic pressures determine states’ foreign policy 
behavior”. 
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by the fact that while all states are subject to structural pressures in varying degrees, how they 
react to those pressures is a matter of their choosing.18 Waltz argues that states choose to 
restrict their behaviours to those that will not call forth dangerous balancing behaviour on the 
part of others. In systems-theory parlance, the international system’s ‘selector’ rewards certain 
behaviours and punishes others.19 Such a selection process underlies the socializing influence 
of the system, which in turn offers states a bleak choice: conform and prosper, or rebel and 
perish. Charles V, Napoleon Bonaparte, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Adolf Hitler chose the latter 
and suffered condignly.20  
My rationale for limiting the present analysis to the post-Cold War world is due 
simply to the fact that this era has been coterminous with the era of unipolarity. The Soviet 
Union’s retreat from superpower status in the late 1980s brought about the dissolution of 
bipolarity and yielded a unipolar structure of international politics defined by the military, 
economic, technological, and political preponderance of the U.S. And in balance-of-power 
theory, unipolarity is the least stable structure of the international system.21 Because 
secondary states cannot be sure as to how the hegemon will dispose of its international pre-
eminence, the logic of anarchy compels them to err on the side of caution and counterbalance 
the hegemonic power, provided they possess the means to do so. As Waltz laments, “[t]he 
lesson would seem to be clear: in international politics, success leads to failure. The excessive 
accumulation of power by one state or coalition of states elicits the opposition of others.”22 
What, then, are we to make of the present American “unipolar moment” so celebrated by 
Charles Krauthammer?23 Christopher Layne, a disciple of Waltz, imputes in his aptly titled 
                                            
18 Waltz, 1979, p. 68 
19 Waltz, 1986, pp. 330-1 
20 Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review, vol. 84, no. 3, 
1990, p. 743 
21 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, 2000, p. 27. 
[Henceforth Waltz, 2000(i).] For an interesting albeit dissenting view, see Wohlforth, 1999.  
22 Quoted in Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review, vol. 
84, no. 3, 1990, p. 743 
23 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1, 1990/1991 
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“The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise” that “the “unipolar moment” is 
just that, a geopolitical interlude that will give way to multipolarity”.24 In brief, balance-of-
power theory argues that American primacy will induce balancing behaviour on the part of 
secondary states.25 Having laid down the theoretical foundation of balance-of-power theory in 
the post-Cold War era, a discussion of more recent efforts to expand the scope of neorealism 
is in order. 
 
II. THE NEOREALIST RESEARCH PROGRAM 
It is now fashionable to designate neorealism as a Lakatosian research program, within which 
much of the theorising of the last three decades has sought to expand its explanatory 
boundaries. In the language of the methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP), 
neorealism, by virtue of its post-1979 theoretical development, is largely considered a 
‘progressive’ research program. And yet, upon closer scrutiny, much of this work has 
constituted a theoretical regress, as theorists have engaged in the profligate and unnecessary 
proliferation of variables that have detracted from Waltz’s original and parsimonious systemic 
statement of neorealist theory. Fareed Zakaria lamented in 1992 the increasing reversion to 
unit-level explanations (‘innenpolitik’) amongst the second generation of neorealists, and yet 
by the end of the decade was himself criticised for failing to practise what he preached.26 
Indeed, Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik have levelled a sweeping condemnation of this 
                                            
24 Quoted in Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” Michael E. Brown, 
Sean M. Lynn-Jones, & Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International 
Security, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 132       
25 Waltz’s own statements on balance-of-power theory in the era of unipolarity are Kenneth Waltz, “The 
Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, 1993; Waltz, 2000(i); and 
Kenneth Waltz, “Intimations of Multipolarity,” in Birthe Hansen & Bertel Heurlin, eds., The New World Order: 
Contrasting Theories, Macmillan, London, 2000, all of which argue that the post-Cold War unipolar system will 
be relatively short-lived. In addition to Waltz’s own writings, two works of his former student Christopher Layne 
paint the same picture: Layne, 1995; and Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End 
of the United States’ Unipolar Moment,” International Security, vol. 31, no. 2, 2006.      
26 Fareed Zakaria, 1995, esp. pp. 475-81. His critique is not limited to Jack Snyder, whose book Myths of Empire 
is the subject of Zakaria’s review essay. In relation to Zakaria’s own reversion to unit-level explanations, see the 
following footnote.   
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recent neorealist theorizing, which they aptly term “minimal realism” because of its tenuous 
links with the ‘hard core’ of the neorealist research program.27 For them, the “degeneration of 
contemporary realism” proceeds apace as so-called neorealists continue to appropriate 
reductionist explanations of state behaviour all the while insisting on their neorealist 
credentials.28 A critical consideration of the major writings representing this recent 
scholarship is therefore in order.  
Balance-of-threat theory, as formulated by Stephen Walt, argues that balance-of-
power theory too narrowly ascribes balancing behaviour to variations in the distribution of 
capabilities within the international system.29 In contrast, balance-of-threat theory posits that 
states balance not solely against power but against levels of threat, which in turn are a 
function of four principal factors: (1) aggregate power; (2) geographic proximity; (3) 
offensive capabilities; (4) offensive intentions.30 Walt takes as example the alliances of the 
Cold War superpowers, and asks why European states did not balance against the U.S., given 
the latter was militarily and economically more powerful than the Soviet Union.31 Balance-of-
threat theory seemingly provides the answer: Soviet power, greater proximity to Western 
Europe, offensive forces, and outwardly hostile ideology ensured a more worrisome threat 
assessment amongst Western European states of Moscow than of Washington. Theories are 
like maps; they condense and simplify a complex realm.32 Their utility lies in their sparsity. In 
the above application of balance-of-threat theory, however, one is hard pressed to differentiate 
the theory from the reality it seeks to explain. Were the ideal map of France the size of 
                                            
27 Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security, vol. 24, no. 2, 
1999. Their critique is primarily targeted at defensive and neoclassical realists. Ibid, 1999, p. 6.  
28 Reductionism is unit-level explanation. 
29 Balance-of-threat theory was first elucidated (although not coined) in Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and 
the Balance of World Power,” Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, & Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of 
Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995, and subsequently 
elaborated (and coined) in Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1987. 
30 Walt, 1995, pp. 214-8; Walt, 1987, ch. 2 
31 Walt, 1995, pp. 238-44  
32 I have appropriated the analogy from John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the 
Past, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, p. 32 
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France, few would find it useful. Yet Walt makes this very same error, and in doing so, 
distances himself from the systemic level of analysis (which is the defining feature of 
neorealism). As Waltz notes: “Reality is complex; theory is simple.”33 
 Within neorealism, another debate has pitted offensive realism against defensive 
realism. Offensive realism has five elementary assumptions: (1) the international system is 
anarchic and is populated by like units (states); (2) states have offensive capabilities; (3) states 
can never be certain of any other state’s present or future intentions; (4) states desire above all 
to survive; and (5) states are rational.34 Despite the fact that offensive realism accepts many 
of Waltz’s fundamental assumptions, this does not hold for the fifth assumption; Waltz does 
not explicitly, or even implicitly, invoke the rational actor model assumed in offensive 
realism.35 This latter point aside, the differences between offensive realism and Waltzian 
neorealism only come to the fore after the five assumptions of offensive realism are combined 
(as Mearsheimer suggests they should in order to grasp the implications of the theory).36 The 
two strands of neorealism diverge over the question of how much power states desire. 
Mearsheimer sees an increase in a state’s relative power as an increase in that state’s security, 
and from this deduces the logical conclusion that the greatest amount of relative power 
correlates with the greatest amount of security.37 Thus, offensive realism implies not only 
                                            
33 Quoted in Waltz, 1997, p. 913 
34 Mearsheimer, 2001, ch. 2, esp. pp. 30-32. Offensive realism was first outlined, albeit in rather rudimentary 
form, in John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” in Michael E. 
Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, & Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and 
International Security, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995, esp. pp. 85-86. Its definitive exposition is in Mearsheimer, 
2001.   
35 Waltz, 1979, p. 118; Waltz, 1986, pp. 330-1. Indeed, in a 2003 lecture, Waltz states that if one were a realist, 
s/he would know that states do not behave rationally. He then asks rhetorically what it means for a person to be 
rational, implying that such an issue is simply not amenable to adequate definition. The lecture is made available 
online at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/911/courses/web_resources.html by the Institute of International 
Studies, UC Berkeley.     
36 Mearsheimer, emphasizing the need to combine the assumptions to reveal their implications, uses the analogy 
of a blender in a 2002 lecture at the University of California-Berkeley on the future of Sino-American relations. 
The lecture is made available online at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/911/courses/web_resources.html by the 
Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley. A good discussion of the differences between Waltzian 
neorealism and offensive realism is found in John Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations: 
Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part II),” International Relations, vol. 20, no. 2, 2006  
37 Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 32-36 
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security maximization but also relative-power maximization (in stark contrast to Waltzian 
neorealism). Furthermore, Mearsheimer believes that states exhibit buck-passing behaviour 
more often than they do balancing behaviour, arguing that states prefer not to shoulder the 
responsibility of containing rival powers but instead attempt to deflect the task onto other 
states.38       
Defensive realism incorporates offence-defence theory (ODT) into Waltzian 
neorealism.39 Starting with Waltz’s sparse structural model, defensive realism adds to it 
considerations of the offence-defence balance (ODB), which conveys whether the defence or 
the offence has the advantage. The ODB is a product of numerous unit-level factors. In its 
sparer formulation, the ODB is determined on the basis of two variables: (1) military 
technology; and (2) geography.40 In its denser formulation, the ODB is measured more 
broadly, and takes into consideration the following: technology, geography, force size, 
nationalism, and the cumulativity of resources (ie the ability to extract resources from 
conquered territory).41 Viewed as such, state behaviour is dependent upon whether the 
international system is defence- or offence-dominant; the former makes possible the 
mitigation of the security dilemma, the latter exacerbates it. Defensive realism is sometimes 
accorded another meaning: that states are “defensive positionalists” insofar as they are status-
quo powers simply intent upon preserving their relative power positions within the 
                                            
38 Ibid, 2001, ch. 8  
39 ODT is basically an attempt to explain unit-level responses to systems-level constraints, and is therefore 
considered a supplement to Waltzian neorealism. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-
Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?” in Michael Brown, Owen Coté Jr., Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven 
Miller, eds., Offense, Defense, and War, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 283. The distinction between defensive 
and offensive realism was first made by Jack Snyder in his 1991 Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and 
International Ambition, although Snyder used the term “aggressive Realism” to denote offensive realism. 
Quoted in Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1991, p. 12. John Mearsheimer makes the distinction in his The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 
Norton, New York, 2001, p. 18ff; Robert Jervis similarly makes the distinction, albeit through game theoretic 
analysis, in his “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security, 
vol. 24, no. 1, 1999, pp. 48-50. Waltz’s views on the distinction are noted below.  
40 The founding work on ODT, and a classic statement of its sparer formulation, is Robert Jervis, “Cooperation 
Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2, 1978. Another seminal work on ODT, which 
specifically analyses the offensive/defensive value of military technology, is George Quester, Offense and 
Defense in the International System, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1977.   
41 The classic exposition of the denser formulation is Glaser and Kaufmann, 2004, esp. pp. 283-289. 
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international system.42 This view is frequently, albeit incorrectly, attributed to Waltz himself. 
Importantly, Waltz argues that the distinction between this latter form of defensive realism 
and offensive realism is not an appropriate one. He has this to say on the matter: “Realist 
theory, properly viewed, is neither offensive nor defensive. … Whether the best way to 
provide for one’s security is by adopting offensive or defensive strategies varies as situations 
change. A state having too much power may scare other states into uniting against it and thus 
become less secure. A state having too little power may tempt other states to take advantage 
of it. Realism is best left without an adjective to adorn it.”43   
Contingent realism, formulated by Charles Glaser, is a variant of defensive realism, 
but nonetheless modifies certain of Waltz’s assumptions and reinterprets one of Waltz’s key 
variables (the distribution of capabilities). Glaser makes three arguments: (1) Waltzian 
neorealism has an unwarranted “competition bias”.44 He argues that arms control 
(cooperation) may be preferable to arms racing (competition) if risk-averse states are unsure 
as to the outcomes of an arms race (which could well be worse for both parties than mutual 
cooperation)45; (2) the distribution of capabilities should be reformulated so as to refer to the 
ability of states to undertake military missions, which is a function of the ODB46; (3) states 
can signal their motives via their military policies and hence alleviate much of the uncertainty 
inherent in international politics.47 Such military policies include arms control, unilateral 
defence, and unilateral restraint. These are particularly potent, for example, if offence has the 
advantage, and can hence reveal a state’s benign motives.48 Glaser nonetheless succumbs to 
                                            
42 Quoted in Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism,” International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, p. 500n. 
43 Quoted in Kenneth N. Waltz, “Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms,” Journal of Politics and Society, vol 
XV, 2004, p. 6 
44 Quoted in Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. 
Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International 
Security, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 386.   
45 Ibid, 1995, p. 387 
46 Ibid, 1995, p. 387  
47 Ibid, 1995, p. 394   
48 Ibid, 1995, pp. 394-397 
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the temptation of reductionism; by incorporating ODT and military signalling into neorealism, 
he merely imports unit-level causes into a systemic theory.    
Neoclassical realism explicitly abandons both parsimony and the search for universal 
theories in its effort to fashion explanatory accounts, or descriptions, of individual states’ 
foreign policies.49 To explain a particular state’s international behaviour, neoclassical realists 
acknowledge, one must start with the systemic level of analysis in neorealist theory in order to 
determine the structural constraints and opportunities created by the international system. 
Having delineated these constraints and dispositions, they investigate how different states 
perceive and then respond to them differently.50 Neoclassical realism thus deals in theory of 
foreign policy, and not in theory of international politics. Moreover, in exploring unit-level 
responses to systems-level stimuli, neoclassical realism stresses the need for “bringing the 
state back in”.51 Contrary to the Waltzian assumption that states are “like units” merely intent 
upon surviving, neoclassical realists seek to differentiate state interests. Randall Schweller 
captures this thinking in his study of bandwagoning in international politics, and why it is 
more frequently practised than is commonly thought.52 Specifically, he enumerates four 
categories of state identities, each of which is named after an animal believed to symbolize 
the respective interests: (1) lions; (2) lambs; (3) jackals; and (4) wolves.53 Lions and lambs 
are status-quo powers; the former, because they stand to lose more, simply cherish their 
possessions more than do the latter. Jackals and wolves are revisionist states; the latter, with 
greater appetites for gains, are merely less risk-averse than are the former. In factoring the 
“balance of interests” into Waltzian neorealism, Schweller argues, a clearer understanding of 
                                            
49 A classic review of neoclassical realist scholarship is Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of 
Foreign Policy,” World Politics, vol. 51, no. 1, 1998. See esp. p. 166.  
50 Intervening variables such as perceptions and domestic state structure interpose between systemic constraints 
and unit-level responses. Rose, 1998, p. 152   
51 Quoted in Rose, 1998, p. 160 
52 Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security, 
vol. 19, no. 1, 1994  
53 Schweller, 1994, pp. 277-81 
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how states behave internationally is made possible.54 The addition of unit-level factors to an 
otherwise sparse systems-level theory is, however, akin to adjusting the theory of gravity to 
account for leaves blown upwards by the wind; the resultant increase in descriptive accuracy 
is not to be conflated with greater explanatory power.   
Hence, this appraisal of recent “minimal realist” scholarship readily reveals two major 
defects. Firstly, this body of work misinterprets the merits of parsimony and the purpose of 
science. As Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism and the person most responsible for 
instituting the scientific method in the study of social phenomena, remarked: “We see that it is 
the nature of positive philosophy to regard all phenomena as subject to invariable natural 
laws, the discovery of which, and their reduction to the least possible number, is the aim and 
end of all our efforts”.55 Minimal realism, however, has evinced a propensity for much the 
converse. Secondly, the surveyed work represents a departure from the systemic level of 
analysis, which would be trivial were a focus on systems-level causes not the defining 
characteristic of neorealist theory. Legro and Moravcsik put it thus: “The result is that many 
realists now advance the very assumptions and causal claims in opposition to which they 
traditionally, and still, claim to define themselves.”56 MSRP may provide an effective lens 
through which to view neorealism, but it is not without its drawbacks. In particular, Waltz 
regrets that research programs, whether ‘progressive’ or ‘degenerative’, may ignore and 
abandon certain potent individual theories embedded within them.57 This happens to be the 
case with regard to the neorealist research program. It is chiefly for this reason that the 
                                            
54 Quoted in ibid, 1994, p. 276 
55 Quoted in Stanislav Andreski, ed., The Essential Comte, selected from Auguste Comte, Cours de Philosophie 
Positive, Barnes & Noble Books, New York, 1974, translated and annotated by Margaret Clarke, p. 24. My 
emphasis. Comte’s use of the term “positive philosophy” is synonymous with positivism, a word he coined to 
denote a positive view of the applicability of the scientific method to both natural and social phenomena. Ibid, 
1974, p. 9 
56 Quoted in Legro and Moravcsik, 1999, p. 6 
57 Waltz makes this case in Kenneth Waltz, “Foreword: Thoughts about Assaying Theories,” in Colin Elman and 
Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 2003 
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remainder of the thesis deals solely with Waltzian neorealism, deemed here its research 
program’s better theory.   
 
III. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM: RECONCILING BALANCE-OF-POWER 
THEORY WITH THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION 
 
Having settled on, and justified my use of, Waltzian neorealism as the subject matter of this 
thesis, a clarification of my research problem is now possible.58 Section I outlined what 
balance-of-power theory predicts in the post-Cold War era. Notwithstanding the expectation 
that unipolarity will have a short lifespan, the fact remains that American military, economic, 
technological, and political preponderance perseveres. Writing shortly after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, Layne predicted the return of multipolarity between 2000 and 2010. In 
2006, he believed balance-of-power theorists (himself included) had wrongly predicted the 
implications of unipolarity for three reasons: (1) they ignored the incentives to bandwagon 
with the United States; (2) they underrated the domestic impediments to balancing American 
power faced by leaders of secondary states; and (3) they believed it would be easier to balance 
against Washington than it has been.59 He nevertheless readjusted his prediction for the return 
of multipolarity, this time claiming the unipolar world will be through by 2030.60 Reminding 
us that balance-of-power theory is indeterminate, Waltz writes that neorealism “is better at 
saying what will happen than in saying when it will happen. Theory cannot say when 
“tomorrow” will come because international political theory deals with the pressures of 
structure on states and not with how states will respond to the pressures.”61 He nevertheless 
insists that a balance of power, “in historical perspectives, …will come in the blink of an 
eye.”62 Glaser, convinced that neorealism has been in trouble in the post-Cold War era, seeks 
                                            
58 Neorealism will henceforth be used to denote Waltzian neorealism. 
59 Layne, 2006, p. 10 
60 Ibid, 2006, p. 39 
61 Quoted in Waltz, 2000(i), p. 27 
62 Quoted in ibid, 2000(i), p. 30 
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to reconcile it with the actual state of affairs by adding unit-level variables to plug the 
apparent ‘holes’ in Waltz’s original theory.63 It therefore appears that, when confronted with 
the question as to why the “unipolar moment” continues to endure, one of two responses is 
given: (1) too little time has passed for a balance of power to form; and (2) balance-of-power 
theory is able to account for the discrepancy once auxiliary unit-level explanations are 
brought forth to supplement it. The first solution is convenient, and cannot be decisively 
refuted; the second solution is reductionist. Can this seeming disjunction between theory and 
reality be resolved without recourse to either of these solutions? 
I argue that this disjunction results from a failure to confront the implications of the 
nuclear revolution for balance-of-power theory. The relevant literature on balance-of-power 
theory has until now largely avoided what is deemed here the vital question: does balance-of-
power theory apply equally well in conventional and nuclear worlds?64 I claim that for 
balance-of-power theory to hold in the nuclear era, in its original and parsimonious 
formulation, a core assumption (not a variable) must be introduced: that second-strike nuclear 
arsenals render void the need to balance superior military power broadly conceived. Recasting 
balance-of-power theory in this fashion permits the theory to apply as effectively in the 
nuclear era as it does in a conventional world, as attention is turned away from the military 
sphere and towards the economic dimension of international politics.       
 
                                            
63 Charles Glaser, “Structural Realism in a More Complex World,” Review of International Studies, vol. 29, 
2003 
64 Two exceptions to this failure to confront the nuclear revolution and its implications for balance-of-power 
theory need mentioning. Mearsheimer has touched upon this issue in passing; his conclusions on the matter, 
however, run counter to my findings in chapter 2. Cf. Mearsheimer, 1990, esp. p. 112. Layne has referred to the 
issue in a footnote, and like Mearsheimer, believes the nuclear revolution impacts little upon the dynamics of 
military competition in neorealist theory. Indeed, Layne’s footnote denies what my thesis sets out to accomplish. 
Layne, 1995, p. 169n       
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CHAPTER 2: THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE DEBATE AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR BALANCE-OF-POWER THEORY 
 
Arthur Lee Burns remarked in 1957 that nuclear weapons have “abolished the balance of 
power”.65 It is the purpose of this chapter to validate this statement in relation to the military 
realm of international politics. The subsequent chapters demonstrate why the statement is not, 
however, applicable to non-military realms of international politics. Here, I present the case 
that second-strike nuclear forces render void the need to balance superior conventional and 
nuclear military power. But before any such analysis can be attempted, a definitional issue 
needs attending. Specifically, what exactly is the scope of military balancing behaviour? Let 
us recall the logic of balance-of-power theory. States interact in an anarchic international 
system in which survival is necessarily their primary concern. If a state loses power relative to 
others, its vulnerability is subsequently heightened, which in turn implies a decrease in its 
security and therefore in its prospects for survival. Thus, all states share a mutual desire to 
forestall losses in their respective relative power positions in international politics. And this 
they do through balancing behaviour. Balancing is, after all, a function of the survival 
imperative. Hence, balancing is invoked only when a consequential decline in a state’s 
relative power position is at issue. Military balancing is therefore defined as the military 
measures undertaken in an attempt to counteract those military capabilities through which 
others can undermine one’s own relative power.  
It is essential not to confound military balancing with military tensions between 
nuclear-weapon states.66 Since the dawn of the nuclear age, there has been much of the latter 
and little of the former. Witness, for instance, the ongoing military tensions between India and 
                                            
65 Quoted in Arthur Lee Burns, “From Balance to Deterrence,” World Politics, vol. 9, no. 4, 1957, p. 509 
66 Robert Art is criticised for making this mistake in Robert Art, Stephen Brooks, William Wohlforth, Keir 
Lieber, and Gerard Alexander, “Correspondence: Striking the Balance,” International Security, vol. 30, no. 3, 
2005, pp. 186, 190, 195 
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Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir province. One could interpret the respective Indian and 
Pakistani military investment in this dispute as a classic case of military balancing among 
nuclear-armed states. And yet the loss or gain of Kashmir for either side will not alter the 
balance of power between India and Pakistan in any significant way. Put differently, their 
respective prospects of survival do not turn upon the loss or gain of Kashmir. As a result, their 
military activities do not constitute military balancing. Balancing behaviour is always directly 
or indirectly linked to the need and desire to survive. Any other military behaviour is non-
balancing behaviour, and thus cannot be explained by balance-of-power theory (a theory 
predicated on the survival motive). Consequently, the analysis undertaken below intends to 
show that retaliatory nuclear forces protect against external military attack those interests the 
loss of which would adversely affect one’s relative power. This covers not only a state’s 
manifestly vital interests, which if attacked would directly endanger its survival, but also 
those lesser interests which if attacked would indirectly threaten its survival, since such an 
attack would decrease its relative power and render it more vulnerable to subsequent military 
action by others. 
 
I. SECOND-STRIKE NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE ASSUMPTIONS OF 
BALANCE-OF-POWER THEORY 
A second-strike capability obtains when a state, having suffered a nuclear first strike from an 
adversary, retains the means to retaliate with nuclear force.67 When a retaliatory strike is 
sufficiently potent to inflict upon an aggressor ‘unacceptable damage’, the conditions for an 
assured-destruction capability are met. ‘Unacceptable damage,’ however, is subjectively 
measured and is dependent upon a state’s strategic culture.68 It is perhaps not inconceivable 
                                            
67 The concept of a second, retaliatory strike was first discussed by Albert Wohlstetter in his “The Delicate 
Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 37, January 1959. Note that Wohlstetter, however, uses the term 
“strike-second capability” in the article.  
68 Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory, Routledge, New York, 1996, pp. 174, 177 
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that the Soviet Union may have tolerated the devastation of one or two of its major cities 
during the Cold War, especially in light of the 20 odd million deaths it suffered in World War 
2, if such were the price for defeating the U.S. More specifically, had Moscow possessed the 
ability to launch a counterforce strike against the American nuclear arsenal, and was certain to 
disarm all but a few nuclear warheads which would have subsequently been launched against 
the Soviet Union, it may well have concluded that this was an acceptable price to pay for 
victory.69 Moreover, Mao Tse-tung was fond of claiming that China could tolerate several 
hundreds of millions of fatalities resulting from a retaliatory blow; lesser levels of relative 
urbanization, and a highly dispersed rural population meant that many nuclear warheads 
would have been needed to inflict assured destruction. As for the United States, its tolerance 
for death and destruction would likely be lower, given its relatively minor losses in 
international wars and its democratic political culture.70 One wonders, then, whether strategic 
culture is easily factored into a nuclear-armed state’s nuclear targeting policies, so as to meet 
the requirements for assured destruction in relation to all potential adversaries. 
 
Targeting Requirements for Assured Destruction 
An assured-destruction capability involves countervalue targeting; it seeks to maximize 
urban-industrial damage. Countries with relatively high levels of urbanization and population 
density are particularly vulnerable to counter-city strikes. Thus, some American urban 
planners and others sought to redesign cities in ways that minimised their vulnerability to 
nuclear attack. The resultant ‘defensive dispersal’ movement floated ideas such as cluster, 
ribbon (or linear), and doughnut cities, which would survive atomic attacks.71 Several civil 
                                            
69 This scenario is discussed in Wohlstetter, 1959, pp. 213-4 
70 I am grateful to Bob Howard, Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney, 
for this, and the preceding point.  
71 Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” in Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic 
Power and World Order, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1946, pp. 99-106; Robert Kargon and 
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defence initiatives, including the 1951 Industrial Dispersal Policy, the 1954 National Housing 
Act (which encouraged suburbanisation), and the 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act designating 
“Interstate and Defense Highways”, were also induced by the bomb.72 The advent of 
thermonuclear weapons thousands of times more powerful than atomic bombs dealt 
‘defensive dispersal’ an almost lethal blow, as fall-out now threatened even those city 
dwellers that survived the initial blast.73 Where countries with relatively low urban 
concentration levels are concerned, their assured destruction will depend more on the 
immediate and longer-term effects of radiation, genetic effects, and the effects of strontium-
90, all of which are produced by fall-out.74 Of these, radiation effects are the most 
immediately lethal. Radiation exposure is measured in roentgens (r’s). Any roentgen dosage 
greater than 600 r’s is fatal. On March 1, 1954, the United States tested a 13.6 megaton 
weapon on Bikini Atoll; the average radiation exposure over 11 265 square kilometres in the 
24 hours following the test was 938 r’s.75 Besides, fall-out effects are maximized by the 
ground bursting of megaton weapons, especially in urban concentrations in which brick 
constructions are prevalent, given that the silicon in bricks, and the lime in mortar, “become 
highly radioactive”.76 The blast, heat, and fall-out effects of nuclear detonations can be 
exploited to maximize death and destruction in any country. Even China’s highly scattered 
rural population can, to a large extent, be rather easily irradiated to life-threatening levels by 
ground-bursting very high-yield warheads in all its major cities.           
 In addition to population targeting, an assured-destruction capability also involves 
economic targeting. The most effective type of economic targeting, it has been demonstrated, 
                                                                                                                                        
Arthur Molella, “The City as Communications Net: Norbert Wiener, the Atomic Bomb, and Urban Dispersal,” 
Technology and Culture, vol. 45, October 2004, pp. 766-7 
72 Michael Dudley, “Sprawl as Strategy: City Planners Face the Bomb,” Journal of Planning Education and 
Research, vol. 21, 2001, pp. 58-60 
73 Ibid, 2001, p. 56; Kargon and Molella, 2004, p. 777. Still, the movement addressed concepts such as 
underground and underwater cities, and still greater dispersal, to lessen these radiation effects. Dudley, 2001, p. 
56. 
74 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Harper & Bros., New York, 1957, pp. 73-85  
75 Ibid, 1957, p. 76 
76 Quoted in ibid, 1957, p. 75 
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is the impairment of an adversary’s recovery economy.77 Counter-recovery targeting is 
accomplished in one of two ways: (1) the bottleneck approach; (2) the Congreve approach.78 
Bottleneck targeting involves damaging or destroying critical nodes and sectors of an 
adversary’s industrial and economic infrastructure. Bottlenecks are “target systems which 
contain only a relatively few installations whose destruction would have immediate and 
disproportionate effects”.79 Examples include fertilizer plants essential for agriculture; ball-
bearing factories upon which a wide range of industries depend; and oil refineries vital for 
everyday civilian applications.80 To be sure, such a targeting strategy assumes that these 
bottlenecks are easily identified and hence vulnerable to discriminatory attacks.81 
Surveillance, photo reconnaissance, and human intelligence may go some way in locating 
bottlenecks, but this may not always be so, in which case use will be made of the Congreve 
approach whereby indiscriminate attacks on capital infrastructure are prosecuted so as to 
degrade a country’s industrial and economic potential. The Congreve approach employs the 
following calculus: “The larger the plant in terms of output of goods, the more important it 
ranks as a target; the type of goods produced is much less important than the estimated value 
of the goods destroyed.”82 Either way, an adversary’s industrial and economic potential is 
vulnerable to precise, small-scale attacks.  
 Nuclear strategists have often exaggerated any given economy’s ability to recovery 
from a nuclear exchange. During the Cold War, influential American economic recovery 
analyses claimed that the Soviet Union could recover from an all-out U.S. nuclear strike in 4-
                                            
77 Desmond Ball, “U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?” in Steven Miller, ed., Strategy and 
Nuclear Deterrence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p. 237 
78 Ibid, 1984, p. 237 
79 Quoted in ibid, 1984, p. 237 
80 Ibid, 1984, p. 237; Michael Kennedy and Kevin Lewis, “On Keeping Them Down; or, Why Do Recovery 
Models Recover So Fast?” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1986, p. 205 
81 Ball, 1984, p. 237; Kennedy and Lewis, 1986, p. 206-7 
82 Ball, 1984, pp. 237-8 
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15 years.83 Michael Kennedy and Kevin Lewis, in a critical dissection of recovery analysis, 
ask “Why Do Recovery Models Recover So Fast?”84 Their study examined the assumptions 
underlying optimistic recovery models, and found them wanting on several scores. Optimistic 
recovery models are predicated on the following three assumptions: (1) the shiftability of 
investment, whereby investment goods output can be freely employed to rebuild “any kind of 
capital” in a post-attack environment85; (2) the ability of the leadership of the post-attack 
economy to prioritise the rebuilding of more important economic sectors; and (3) “capital-
labor substitution”86, implying the shiftability of labor and capital between different economic 
sectors even after a nuclear attack.87 Together, these assumptions drive down the recovery 
times of a post-attack economy. However, each of these assumptions is respectively flawed 
for the following reasons: (1) the non-shiftability of investment, whereby investment goods 
output is not simply a “homogenous” entity that can be channelled into the production of all 
types of capital goods88; (2) the ability to prioritise is belied by the fact that there is likely to 
be little economic coordination in the aftermath of a nuclear attack; and (3) the shiftability of 
labour and capital between various economic sectors may be constrained in a post-attack 
environment.89 Optimistic economic recovery models are further tainted by the fact that they 
ignore other critical assumptions. For instance, given that there is likely to be little “capital 
labor substitutability” in a post-attack environment, the survival of skilled labour has been (in 
previous conflicts) and will continue to be “the linchpin of recovery”.90 The earlier discussion 
of population targeting, however, does not bode well for the survival of skilled labour, most 
of which is located in a country’s major cities (which are the primary target sets for an 
assured-destruction capability). 
                                            
83 Kennedy and Lewis, 1986, p. 195 
84 Quoted in ibid, 1986, p. 194 
85 Quoted in ibid, 1986, p. 200  
86 Quoted in ibid, 1986, p. 203  
87 Ibid, 1986, pp. 200-3 
88 Quoted in ibid, 1986, p. 205 
89 Ibid, 1986, pp. 204-5 
90 Quoted in ibid, pp. 207-8 
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Survivability and Delivery of Strategic Nuclear Forces for Assured Destruction    
Thus far, no attention has been paid to the survivability of the strategic nuclear forces, or to 
the delivery of nuclear warheads to their targets, with respect to an assured-destruction 
capability. Both issues are taken up in turn. The strategic nuclear forces of a sophisticated 
nuclear arsenal are divided into three components, which together constitute the strategic 
‘triad’. First, there are the land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Second, 
there are the sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Third, there are the 
manned bombers. Neither component is in any real sense vulnerable, although the ICBM 
component is generally considered to be more vulnerable than its counterparts. The SLBM 
force aboard nuclear-powered ballistic-missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs) is normally the 
least vulnerable component, by virtue of the ability of SSBNs to operate at almost 
undetectable levels in expansive oceans. The manned bomber force, if kept on adequate alert, 
will escape total destruction, especially if a portion of the force is kept on continuous airborne 
patrol. But ICBMs, whose fixed-site locations may be known to an adversary, are relatively 
more prone to enemy destruction. Even mobile ICBMs can be located and tracked through 
aerial and satellite reconnaissance. These vulnerabilities notwithstanding, ICBMs are only 
vulnerable to the extent that an enemy can successfully fashion a first-strike counterforce 
capability, about which more will be said later. Importantly, it is worth noting that “with 
nuclear weapons, if any part of a force is invulnerable, all of the force is invulnerable”.91 The 
triad has three legs but can stand on one.           
 Admittedly, the acquisition and maintenance of such sophisticated forces would 
require considerable budgetary investment, itself co-ordinated to the similar efforts of other 
                                            
91 Kenneth Waltz, “Waltz Responds to Sagan,” in Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons: A Debate Renewed, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2003, p. 143; Bernard Brodie, “The 
Development of Nuclear Strategy,” in Steven Miller, ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1984, p. 9 
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nuclear-weapon states. Surely this would seem to contradict the argument presently being 
advanced, namely that second-strike forces render unnecessary the need to balance superior 
military power. The concept of the strategic triad, however, greatly exaggerates the efforts 
required of an assured-destruction capability. Unconventional and less sophisticated means of 
strategic nuclear delivery are almost as effective, and in some cases may be just as efficient, 
as the more conventional and sophisticated delivery means discussed above. An important 
study on the threat of nuclear terrorism against the U.S. expressly states that the assumption 
“that the delivery of a nuclear weapon against the United States is a challenge” is “dead 
wrong”.92 Moreover, the Allison study argues, “the means of delivery into or against the 
United States are essentially infinite”.93 It posits that nuclear weapons and fissile material are 
easily transportable. One hundred pounds of highly enriched uranium (HEU) has a blast 
equivalent of 10-20 kilotons (ie as powerful as the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima), and 
yet is no larger than the size of a grapefruit.94 Alternatively, “[a] quantity of plutonium the 
size of an apple is enough to make a simple fission weapon”.95 Also, nuclear weapons 
themselves exist in sizes small enough to be carried in a backpack, in a small truck, or in the 
boot of a car.96 In addition, no health risks attend the human transportation of weapons 
quantities of fissile material. The radioactive alpha particles emitted by plutonium cannot 
penetrate human skin. Hence plutonium is easily carried in a person’s pocket free of harm.97 
HEU is barely radioactive and can be handled directly in a very safe manner.98 
                                            
92 Quoted in Graham Allison, Owen Coté, Jr., Richard Falkenrath, Steven Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: 
Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
1996, p. 12. Henceforth referred to as the Allison study. Allison et al. lament the “remarkably little literature on 
unconventional means of delivery”. Ibid, 1996, p. 69. Their study, however, focuses on the threat of nuclear 
terrorism, and not on the ease with which an assured-destruction capability can be mounted, which is the 
argument I am presenting here.    
93 Quoted in ibid, 1996, p. 13. My emphasis. 
94 Ibid, 1996, p. 1 
95 Quoted in ibid, 1996, p. 45 
96 Ibid, 1996, p. 46 
97 Ibid, 1996, p. 44 
98 Ibid, 1996, pp. 45, 67 
 25
HONOURS THESIS  Alex Lombard  
 Transportability aside, how are nuclear weapons and fissile material to be delivered to 
their destinations? The Allison study discusses the porous nature of American borders. It 
distinguishes between legal and illegal points of entry. Of the former, there are 301. Consider, 
for example, the case of shipping ports. A 2004 study by a national non-profit public interest 
organization on port security in the U.S. reveals that only 4-6% of annual inbound freight is 
inspected by the Coast Guard and the Customs Service.99 That corresponds to 7.52-7.68 
million uninspected containers every year, in which nuclear weapons or fissile material could 
easily be hidden.100 It has even been suggested that nuclear weapons could be delivered in 
component form via the postal service.101 Although customs inspectors patrol legal points of 
entry, “none … are trained or equipped to detect nuclear materials”.102 And while radiation 
detection equipment exists in the U.S., it does so only at a very limited number of sites.103 
Radiation detectors, whether active or passive, are nonetheless inadequate and inefficient, and 
almost useless in the event that nuclear weapons or fissile material are shielded so as to evade 
possible detection.104 These efforts may after all be negligible, since any inspection and 
detection efforts are undertaken “only after” the inbound cargo has arrived at sea and air ports 
“in or near major U.S. cities”.105 But by this time, it would obviously be too late to intercept 
what would in effect be a retaliatory blow; a nuclear weapon exploded on arrival at a U.S. 
port would be just as effective and just as destructive a countervalue strike as an attack with 
an ICBM on the same target. Concerning illegal points of entry, one need only note the U.S. 
                                            
99 Public Citizen, “Ports Unsecured: America’s Vulnerable Shipping Borders,” released on October 15th, 2004, 
accessible online at: http://www.citizen.org/homelandsec/index.cfm?relatedpages=1&catID=114&secID=2226. 
Accessed June 2007. Similarly, Graham Allison claimed in January 2004 that only 2% of the estimated 7 million 
inbound shipping containers estimated for 2004 would be opened for inspection. See Graham Allison, “How to 
Stop Nuclear Terror,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 1, 2004, online edition 
100 My calculation. 
101 Ibid, 1996, p. 69 
102 Allison et al., 1996, p. 65 
103 Ibid, 1996, p. 67 
104 Ibid, 1996, pp. 67-8 
105 Quoted in ibid, 1996, p. 65 
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government’s inability to prevent both drug smuggling and illegal immigration.106 The 
Allison study remarks that “[t]here is no reason why a nuclear weapon is less likely to make it 
into the United States than a bale of marijuana, a packet of heroin, or a farm worker from 
Latin America”.107 In sum, an assured destruction capability need not require sophisticated 
strategic delivery systems; a relatively unsophisticated and unconventional nuclear arsenal is 
not necessarily more vulnerable than the U.S. Strategic Triad, especially if an ample supply of 
fissile material is available. 
Inasmuch as the strategic nuclear forces vital to an assured-destruction capability can 
be made invulnerable, what are the requirements for their supporting command, control, and 
communications (C³) architecture? C³ systems are intrinsic to an assured-destruction 
capability, but are “inherently more vulnerable than the strategic forces themselves”.108 
Specifically, C³ systems are vulnerable not only to those attacks directed at the strategic 
nuclear forces, but also to additional attacks and collateral effects.109 More on C³ 
vulnerabilities will be said later, but it is important to stress here that among possible nuclear 
postures, an assured-destruction capability demands the sparest C³ network. After all, the sole 
C³ requirement for an assured-destruction capability is to ensure a secure communications 
link from the national command authorities to the actual strategic nuclear forces.110 Such a 
link provides the means by which a political leadership would instruct the commanders of the 
deterrent forces to execute the retaliatory mission. While a two-way communications link 
between the leadership and the forces is preferable, only a one-way link from the leadership to 
the forces is imperative.111 This requirement is easily accommodated at little expense simply 
by increasing the redundancy of communications links. And this is attained by laying down 
                                            
106 Ibid, 1996, p. 66 
107 Quoted in ibid, 1996, p. 66 
108 Quoted in Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled? Adelphi Paper, no. 169, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, London, 1981, p. 37   
109 Ibid, 1981, p. 10 
110 Ibid, 1981, p. 6 
111 Ibid, 1981, p. 6 
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additional hardened underground dual- or multi-thread cables, by extending the range of radio 
and satellite transmission channels, or by developing alternative underground/airborne 
national command posts from which orders could also be disseminated to the forces. Having 
established a C³ network of adequate redundancy to fulfil an assured-destruction capability, 
only maintenance efforts are needed hereafter. Overall, the requisite C³ architecture to ensure 
assured destruction can be wrought upon an opponent is minimal, and need not be attuned to 
the efforts of actual or potential rivals.                                
 
‘The Great Equalizer’ 
Based upon the evidence adduced above, the weapons requirements for assured destruction 
are considerably lower than those former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated 
in 1967. For McNamara, assured destruction of an adversary would result if between one-fifth 
and one-quarter of its population, and between one-half and two-thirds of its industry, were 
destroyed.112 This corresponded to a megaton equivalent of 200-400.113 Interestingly, 
McNamara scaled down his assured destruction criteria in 1992, believing that 60 strategic 
nuclear warheads would be largely sufficient for the U.S.114 Perhaps spare warheads should 
be reserved for nuclear testing purposes. Nuclear testing, it could be argued, demonstrates 
unambiguously a country’s potential for assured destruction, and also assists the improvement 
of strategic weapons systems. In testing a nuclear device, a country is communicating 
(whether successfully or not) the certainty of its nuclear deterrent. An assured-destruction 
capability, however, exploits and benefits greatly from uncertainty.115 Who would be 
                                            
112 Desmond Ball, “The Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983,” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., 
Strategic Nuclear Targeting, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986, p. 69 
113 Dieter Lutz, “A Counterforce/Countervalue Scenario – or How Much Destructive Capability is Enough?” 
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 20, no. 1, 1983, p. 24  
114 Waltz, 2003, p. 142 
115 Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper, no. 171, International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1981, p. 15. Witness Israel’s stated policy of strategic ambiguity, which 
has as its objective ‘deterrence through uncertainty’. Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for 
the 1980s, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982, p. 10 
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prepared to undertake offensive military operations against an adversary, when the precise 
content and location(s) of the latter’s nuclear arsenal are unknown? Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat and Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad stopped short of extending the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War beyond the Disputed Territories, in part because they were unsure as to whether Israel 
did or did not possess a ‘bomb-in-the-basement’ capability.116 Quite simply, they were not 
prepared to allay their doubts when doing so could well have resulted in the levelling of Cairo 
and Damascus. Israel has never conducted any atmospheric testing of its purported nuclear 
arsenal; few, however, take this to mean Israel’s deterrent is impotent. Israel has deterred, as 
well as any other nuclear-weapon state, those attacks that threatened its manifestly vital 
interests.117 Nuclear testing, thus viewed, adds nothing to an assured-destruction capability. In 
summary, assured destruction need not depend upon very many nuclear weapons. It is chiefly 
for this reason that an assured-destruction capability is a relatively economical means of 
deterring superior military power.118           
 With only a relatively small number of nuclear weapons, a country can deter all major 
nuclear and conventional military attacks that threaten its survival. Hence the concept of 
minimum deterrence, whereby one retains only enough nuclear weapons so as to inflict upon 
an aggressor unacceptable damage in a second (retaliatory) strike. It is because the 
requirements of deterrence are few and finite that nuclear weapons are considered ‘the great 
equalizer’. Strategic parity thus results among states armed with retaliatory nuclear forces; as 
Robert Jervis reminds us, “nuclear superiority doesn’t matter”.119 But is the notion of 
conventional military superiority among nuclear-weapon states similarly flawed? Answering 
                                            
116 Waltz discusses the issue of the Disputed Territories in the 2003 lecture, cited earlier. A bomb-in-the-
basement posture refers to an undeclared deterrent capability. Feldman, 1982, p. 7  
117 On the effectiveness of Israel’s “opaque” nuclear status, see Jeremy Goldberg, Parag Khanna, and Kenneth 
Waltz, “Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. About Nukes?” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 
Winter/Spring 2000, p. 53.   
118 Waltz, 1981, p. 8 
119 Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 94, no. 4, 1979-
1980 
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negatively requires showing how superior conventional military power might be brought to 
bear on a nuclear-armed state in ways that do not prompt an all-out nuclear exchange.  
Consider for instance North Korea, which in many ways represents an ideal test case; 
it has recently acquired a minimum deterrent nuclear arsenal, and its conventional forces are 
very weak in relative terms. In light of the diplomatic tensions that pervade U.S.-North 
Korean relations, especially over the issue of Pyongyang’s accession to the nuclear club in 
October 2006, one wonders how Washington might employ its superior conventional military 
power against North Korea. Upon the detection of incoming U.S fighter and bomber aircraft, 
however, how can the North Korean leadership be completely reassured that the aircraft are 
not “the prelude to an all-out surprise attack”?120 Such guaranty is simply impossible in such 
matters. Therefore, conventional military operations against a nuclear-armed state can rather 
easily induce an unintended all-out nuclear exchange, especially if the aggressed state fears 
the loss of its retaliatory capability.121 Furthermore, the application of superior conventional 
firepower, even if only of a limited nature, against North Korea would in all probability 
intentionally or inadvertently destroy vital C³ systems through which Pyongyang would order 
a retaliatory strike were its vital interests compromised.122 With these systems inoperable, 
North Korea would in effect be disarmed. Thus, it is most likely that the North Korean 
leadership, fearing the loss of its second-strike capability, would order a retaliatory strike 
before its communications links to the nuclear forces were completely severed. And this 
would consequently work to reinforce its deterrent threat against both American nuclear and 
conventional attack, limited or all-out, especially as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, although 
limited, holds several major American cities hostage.123  
                                            
120 I have appropriated this scenario from Kissinger, 1957, p. 158 
121 Barry Posen, “Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank,” in Steven Miller, ed., 
Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p. 88 
122 See discussion on C³ vulnerabilities, below. 
123 See discussion on limited war, below.  
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The conclusion now seems apparent. Namely, minimum deterrent arsenals void the 
need to balance superior nuclear and conventional military power, seeing as such power can 
in no meaningful way be used to increase one’s relative power in relation to a nuclear-weapon 
state. If nuclear weapons equalize military power differentials, the third definition of the 
structure of the international system in neorealist theory – the distribution of capabilities – is 
altered. More precisely, insofar as the military dimension of international politics is 
concerned, the systemic incentive to check and balance superior military power disappears 
altogether. Thus far, the analysis has been framed wholly within the context of minimum 
deterrence. Minimum deterrence, however, constitutes but one school of thought in the 
nuclear deterrence debate. The remainder of the chapter therefore considers the other 
contending schools of thought in the debate, and asks whether any of them vitiates the 
conclusion reached in this section.   
  
II. MINIMUM DETERRENCE AND ITS CRITICS 
This section addresses the various other perspectives in the nuclear deterrence debate, 
focusing in particular on their respective critiques of minimum deterrence.  
  
The Delicacy of Deterrence 
Some have argued that minimum deterrence underestimates the requirements of proper 
deterrence. Adherents of this view, first articulated by Albert Wohlstetter in “The Delicate 
Balance of Terror”, reject the “automatic” and inevitable stability of nuclear deterrence, and 
argue that a host of challenges must constantly be addressed so as to ensure the deterrent force 
remains invulnerable.124 In particular, they argue, minimum deterrent arsenals are prone to 
surprise attacks, which could render impotent their retaliatory blows. In other words, the crux 
                                            
124 Quoted in Wohlstetter, 1959, p. 222 
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of deterrence is not so much the ability to retaliate per se, but rather the ability to inflict upon 
an aggressor unacceptable damage even after suffering a surprise counterforce attack. Were 
only a few weapons to survive such a surprise attack, and were the aggressor’s air and 
ballistic missile defence systems able to intercept most of these surviving warheads before 
they fulfilled their retaliatory mission, a minimum deterrent arsenal may fail to deter.125 But 
would an aggressor launch a surprise counterforce attack in the absence of any certainty of 
destroying a sufficiently large portion of the adversary’s arsenal, and in the absence of any 
guarantee that its air and missile defences would effect a sufficient attrition of the retaliatory 
attack? U.S. Tactical Air Command abstained from such an option even as it was confident of 
knocking out 90% of the Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) force stationed in 
Cuba in October 1962.126 No country has ever attempted a surprise counterforce attack in the 
nuclear age; one readily understands the hesitancy.                   
The delicacy of deterrence, the argument continues, may invite nuclear blackmail. 
Even among nuclear-armed states, if nuclear superiority does in fact matter, the stronger can 
pressure the weaker to concede on important issues simply by touting the prospect of greater 
loss, or perhaps even defeat, in a nuclear exchange. John Mearsheimer, in an influential article 
published in 1990, believes that by “ganging up”, nuclear-armed aggressors may 
“overwhelm” another nuclear-weapon state’s deterrent.127 This would permit aggressors to 
“bully” even a country armed with a second-strike capability.128 Upon closer examination, 
however, such a prospect seems technically unattainable. Surprisingly, Mearsheimer frames 
this argument in the post-Cold War European context. But of all regions, the prospect of 
nuclear blackmail would seem least likely to work in Europe, for the simple reason that trans-
border travel within the European Union has been increasingly facilitated by the political 
                                            
125 I have merely adapted Wohlstetter’s thesis to the present situation. Ibid, 1959, pp. 211-34 
126 Waltz, 1981, p. 16 
127 Quoted in Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 112 
128 Quoted in ibid, 1990, p. 112 
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integration efforts of the last half-century. How then would a nuclear-capable Germany bully 
France, when the latter’s force de frappe, even were it to lose its IRBMs, SLBMs, and 
manned bombers, could fairly easily deliver several nuclear weapons to all major German 
cities by open road? Alternatively, a few oxcarts laden with nuclear weapons and pulled 
through the Black Forest could just as easily accomplish the retaliatory mission.129 Earlier in 
the cited article, Mearsheimer unequivocally asserts that “[t]here is not a single case of a 
leader brandishing nuclear weapons during a crisis, or behaving as if nuclear war might be a 
viable option for solving important political problems”, a fact he seems to overlook later in 
the same article.130  
 
First-Strike Capability 
A successful first-strike capability is achieved in either of two ways: (1) through counterforce 
targeting; and/or (2) through damage limitation strategies, amongst which the deployment of 
an impregnable ballistic missile defence (BMD) system is the ultimate example. Supporters of 
the need for a first-strike capability distrust the deterrent threat of assured destruction 
altogether. Colin Gray, an exemplar of this school of thought, summarized the case for an 
American first-strike doctrine during the Cold War as follows: “First and foremost, the Soviet 
leadership fears defeat, not the suffering of damage – and defeat … has to entail the forcible 
demise of the Soviet state.”131 Thus, the prospect of defeat in a nuclear war would be the 
substantive deterrent, and not merely the promise of retaliation. While politically sound, such 
a “theory of victory” is next to impossible to implement technically.132  
                                            
129 On oxcart delivery in general, see Waltz, 2003, p. 147. 
130 Quoted in ibid, 1990, p. 101; Similarly, Richard Betts argued in 1987 that no Soviet threats of nuclear 
blackmail were “effective” against the U.S. Richard Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, The 
Brookings Institution, Washington, 1987, pp. 217-8.  
131 Quoted in Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: The Case For a Theory of Victory,” in Steven Miller, ed., Strategy and 
Nuclear Deterrence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p. 30. Emphasis in original.  
132 Quoted in ibid, 1984, p. 49 
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 A first-strike counterforce capability obtains when one can disarm an adversary’s 
entire nuclear arsenal. This involves locating and tracking an adversary’s fixed-site and 
mobile ICBM launchers, SSBNs, and manned bombers. But even this preliminary 
requirement is achieved with difficulty; SSBNs at sea can rather easily avoid being exposed 
by anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces, and bombers flown at very low altitudes can evade 
radar detection.133 Notwithstanding this setback, counterforce targeting relies on very high 
accuracy and “near-perfect attack sequencing”.134 The precision of a ballistic missile is 
measured by a circular error probable (CEP), which is defined as the radius of the circle 
around a target, within which will fall half the launched warheads. The CEP takes into 
account those errors induced by atmospheric conditions, gravitational pressures, the rotation 
of the earth, magnetic effects, and a host of other technical errors.135 To be sure, a CEP also 
denotes a circle of equal probability: there is a 50% chance that a given warhead will fall 
within the circle, and a 50% chance that it will not.136 Thus, by increasing the warhead’s yield 
so as to effect a twofold increase in its radius of destruction (r), one is assured the target will 
be hit. If warhead yields factor in the equation r=2CEP, the precision problem of counterforce 
targeting is largely mitigated.137 This assumes, of course, that nuclear warheads are delivered 
to their targets without compromising the arrival of the remainder of the volley. This 
‘fratricide effect’, however, could prove a major stumbling block for counterforce 
targeting.138 In brief, there are simply too many uncertainties involved in a counterforce strike 
for it to be a viable strategy. Even a rudimentary minimum deterrent arsenal is scarcely 
susceptible to a counterforce attack; the prospect of even a few nuclear weapons, stored in a 
                                            
133 Not to mention the B-2 and F-117 stealth bombers, both of which are undetectable by radar. 
134 Quoted in Feldman, 1982, p. 41 
135 Ibid, 1982, p. 41-2; Ball, 1984, p. 224  
136 James Constant, Fundamentals of Strategic Weapons: Offense and Defense Systems, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague, 1981, p. 140. Henceforth Constant, 1981a. 
137 Ibid, 1981a, p. 141 
138 Feldman, 1982, p. 42 
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rural barn and unbeknownst to an aggressor, surviving a full-scale counterforce strike is 
sufficient to induce pause for thought.139 
 To many, the shield and sword analogy effectively captures the logic of ‘strategic 
defence’: an impregnable BMD system provides a state with a shield, behind which it can 
employ, or at least threaten to employ, the sword offensively without having to fear the 
retaliatory strikes the victim would doubtless launch in turn. The analogy is a good one; its 
interpretation is not. ‘Strategic defence’ is a misnomer. Far from providing an effective 
defence against all possible means of strategic delivery, BMD is merely a defence against one 
means of delivering strategic weapons - ballistic missiles. But as we saw earlier, the possible 
means of strategic delivery are almost limitless. If anything, BMDs indirectly promote the 
further pursuit of such means.140 Even in the case of conventional means of strategic delivery, 
BMDs are effectively flouted by firing ICBMs and SLBMs on fractional-orbit (depressed) or 
lofted trajectories so as to greatly reduce the time with which the intended victim has to detect 
and intercept the incoming warheads.141 Alternatively, an all-decoy attack against the BMD 
system could exhaust the latter’s store of interceptor missiles; upon the depletion of this store 
of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), the subsequent all-warhead attack would proceed with 
relative impunity.142  
The use of penetration aids on re-entry vehicles (RVs) further degrades a BMD 
system’s effectiveness.143 For instance, RVs can eject chaff, spot or volume, to confuse 
enemy radar or to conceal their precise trajectories. Other penetration aids include: electronic 
countermeasures (ECM), which actively jam defensive radar; booster fragments 
accompanying the RV on its ballistic trajectory, which serve to confuse enemy radar until 
                                            
139 See Quester, 1977, p. 206 
140 Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review, vol. 84, no. 3, 
1990, p. 742 
141 Ibid, 1990, p. 742; Constant, 1981a, pp. 117-20 
142 James Constant, Fundamentals of Strategic Weapons: Offense and Defense Systems, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague, 1981, p. 39. Henceforth Constant, 1981b. 
143 The subsequent discussion draws on Constant, 1981a, pp. 120-33. 
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they re-enter the earth’s atmosphere, upon which the heavier RV is filtered from the lighter 
fragments; decoys (eg balloons), which effectively confuse defensive radar, especially during 
the mid-course phase of the RV’s trajectory, after which atmospheric filtering permits the 
enemy to discriminate between the RV and the decoys; the reduction of the RV’s radar cross 
section “through such means as absorptive coatings, paints, and contouring”144; multiple 
independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), of which some models can launch more 
than 20 RVs per missile; manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MARVs) capable of effecting in-
flight changes in the RVs’ trajectories by means of external tabs; radar blackout intended to 
paralyse enemy radar, which would ensue from either deliberate high-altitude detonations or 
from the nuclear explosions of enemy interceptor missiles designed to destroy incoming RVs; 
and lastly, a BMD system is relatively prone to enemy destruction or impairment, seeing as 
many of its components (eg radar installations) are naturally ‘soft’ targets.  
Moreover, the ability of BMD to fulfil even the task assigned to it – the interception of 
enemy ballistic missiles (especially by ‘hit-to-kill’ technology) – has been, and continues to 
be, highly suspect.145 Judging from this discussion of BMD, it is safe to say that no state can 
conceivably immunize itself completely from retaliatory nuclear strikes. To conclude, the 
shield and sword analogy is worth retaining; the shield-wielding swordsperson will forever 
remain prone to attacks from the rear and side, and to thrusts directed at her/his exposed legs. 
U.S. President Ronald Reagan nicknamed his Strategic Defense Initiative of March 1983 
“Star Wars”; such a designation aptly reminds us that it and every subsequent effort to fashion 
a ‘strategic defence’ system is better left to science fiction. 
 
 
 
                                            
144 Quoted in Constant, 1981a, p. 127  
145 No full-proof system is in existence. 
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Limited War 
For some nuclear strategists, the Korean War (1950-1953) laid bare the inability of nuclear 
weapons to deter limited local aggression.146 The Eisenhower administration attempted to 
remedy the problem by adopting the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’, whereby local 
aggression, even of a limited nature, against U.S. interests or allies would occasion an all-out 
retaliatory nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. No sooner had the administration 
announced its doctrine in January 1954 than it was criticised for the incredibility of its threat. 
Would Washington really have initiated ‘massive retaliation’ against the Sino-Soviet bloc for 
the latter’s instigation of aggression on the Korean peninsula, even though vital American 
interests were not at stake? The question answers itself. William Kaufmann, in his influential 
critique of the administration’s doctrine, anticipated the need for options short of all-out 
retaliation: “We must, in a word, try to fit the punishment to the crime.”147 Much theorising 
thus turned to the issue of limited war, by which means it was believed a state’s military 
power could serve its foreign policy objectives, even in the thermonuclear age.148 Like the 
periods 1648-1789 and 1815-1914, during which limited war, as an instrument of state policy, 
was the modus operandi of European great-power politics, limited-war theorists now faced 
the task of adjusting the practice of limited war to the nuclear era.149  
 Limited wars are of two types: local and central.150 The former are fought on the 
territories of third parties; the latter are waged on one or both parties’ homelands. If a war is 
to remain limited, it is often argued, its participants must agree upon the observance of 
limitations, even if only tacitly. Moreover, the “ground rules” for limited war fighting must be 
established before the outbreak of hostilities, since the means to negotiate limits during the 
                                            
146 Morton Halperin, “Limited War: An Essay on the Development of the Theory and An Annotated 
Bibliography,” Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, 1962, pp. 1-2 
147 Quoted in William Kaufmann, “The Requirements of Deterrence,” Memorandum Number Seven, Center of 
International Studies, Princeton University, November 15, 1954, p. 15 
148 Kissinger, 1957, p. 141 
149 Ibid, 1957, p. 141-2 
150 Halperin, 1962, p. 11   
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conflict are likely to be tenuous.151 But it is probable that a war could be kept limited even in 
the absence of any such accord, seeing as the losing side is unlikely to escalate the conflict 
into an all-out nuclear exchange just to avoid defeat. After all, defeat in a limited war by no 
means implies the surrendering of one’s sovereignty. Hence the basis of limited war: because 
a state’s sovereignty is not at issue in a limited war, one presumes it would invariably choose 
defeat in such a war over annihilation, seeing as mutual assured destruction would surely 
obtain were the losing side to disregard all limitations.152 The acceptance of limits, explicit or 
otherwise, is nonetheless essential for waging a limited war. The two principal categories of 
limitations are those concerned with targets, and those related to the types of weapons used. 
Insofar as targets are concerned, limited war presupposes at least one limitation – ‘city 
avoidance’ – to which adherence is essential if the war is to be kept from exploding into an 
all-out confrontation.153 As concerns weapons, it is unlikely that cities would escape damage 
in a limited exchange fought with strategic nuclear weapons, no matter how committed the 
contending parties may be to observing city avoidance.154 Thus, a limited war could only 
feasibly be fought with conventional armoury and tactical nuclear weapons.    
Proponents of limited-war doctrines usually fall into one of two groups: (1) those who 
believe that limited wars should be fought with conventional weapons only; and (2) those who 
believe that limited wars should be fought with tactical nuclear weapons primarily. Advocates 
of limited conventional war argue that the introduction of nuclear weapons into a limited 
conflict would create uncontrollable escalatory pressures and would make the continued 
limitation of the conflict exceptionally difficult.155 Supporters of limited nuclear war believe a 
limited conventional conflict would require the amassing of large bodies of troops and 
                                            
151 Kissinger, 1957, p. 202 
152 Ibid, 1957, p. 186; Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 
1963, pp. 33, 102  
153 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959 [1965], p. 310 
154 One exception may be the air bursting of strategic warheads at altitudes high enough to avoid fall-out effects. 
But high-altitude detonations have pernicious consequences for C³ systems, the maintenance of which are critical 
in a limited war. See discussion of C³ vulnerabilities below.  
155 Halperin, 1963, p. 70 
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extensive supply lines, providing easy targets for tactical nuclear strikes. Henry Kissinger, an 
early and leading proponent of limited nuclear war, argued also that small, mobile self-
contained land units equipped with tactical nuclear weapons could rather easily deny enemy 
control of disputed territory.156             
 The conduct of a limited war would likely proceed in phases, with intermittent 
intervals for negotiation between the adversaries, since the prospect and promise of war-
termination are intrinsic to the concept of limited war.157 And yet, those relatively ‘soft’ 
communications systems vital for intra-war negotiation are unlikely to survive very long in a 
limited conventional war, and less so in a limited nuclear war. Collateral blast overpressures 
of only 5 pounds per square inch (psi) would suffice to render such systems inoperable.158 
Closely connected to this issue is that of C³ vulnerabilities more broadly, and their 
implications for the conduct of a limited nuclear war.159 C³ systems are prone to damage and 
destruction from the effects of nuclear detonations, which are briefly summarised below.160 
The blast effects of nuclear weapons can destroy even the world’s sturdiest constructions; 
indeed, even the North American Air Defence (NORAD) buried under some 400 metres of 
granite in Cheyenne Mountain can be destroyed by blast overpressures exceeding 5000 psi, 
which is within reach of some high-yield warheads.161 Radiation effects include atmospheric 
ionisation, which can impair radio and radar systems; transient radiation effects on electronics 
(TREE), which can degrade important electronic systems; and electromagnetic pulse (EMP), 
which similarly affect electrical and electronic systems. Sabotage, jamming, and deficient 
communications security can also be exploited to further destroy C³ systems. As Desmond 
Ball writes, moreover: “It is axiomatic that the chain of command is only as strong as its 
                                            
156 Kissinger, 1957, pp. 178-182 
157 Ibid, 1957, pp. 225-6; Halperin, 1963, 101   
158 Ball, 1984, p. 229  
159 The remainder of this section focuses on limited nuclear war, since the prospects for keeping a conventional 
conflict from exploding into all-out war were discussed in Section I.  
160 The following discussion draws on Ball, 1981, pp. 9-14   
161 Ibid, 1981, p. 10 
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weakest link.”162 Hence, the progressive degrading of a state’s C³ systems throughout a 
limited nuclear war would deprive the political leadership from exercising ‘escalation 
control’, whereby an adversary can escalate its war effort without inducing all-out war. And 
without the means to properly execute discriminatory attacks, a limited nuclear war would in 
all likelihood become total.  
Additional dilemmas accompany the fighting of limited nuclear wars. Namely, the 
component of the strategic forces upon which most reliance is likely to be placed in a limited 
nuclear war, given its greater ability to survive a “counterforce war of attrition”163, is the 
submarine force. And yet, this component is the least suited for limited war fighting. Unless a 
submarine launches all its SLBMs in a single volley, it risks detection (and subsequent 
destruction by enemy ASW forces) via the ‘backtracking’ of SLBM trajectories. But because 
target limitations counsel against such massive attacks (a submarine’s SLBM stock is often 
greater than 100), the submarine force will in effect be useless.164 As regards tactical nuclear 
warfare, the blinding effects of nuclear explosions, especially at night, would generate “heavy 
casualties” even among those situated outside the weapons’ radii of destruction.165 All told, a 
limited nuclear war cannot realistically endure beyond “either a few days or a few tens of 
detonations”.166 Desmond Ball, in a trenchant critique of limited nuclear war, asserts:  
Given the impossibility of developing capabilities for controlling a nuclear exchange 
through to favourable termination, or of removing the residual uncertainties relating to 
controlling the large-scale use of nuclear weapons, it is likely that decision-makers 
would be deterred from initiating nuclear strikes no matter how limited or selective 
the options available to them.167  
 
                                            
162 Quoted in Ball, 1981, p. 9 
163 Quoted in Jervis, 1979-1980, p. 623  
164 Ball, 1981, pp. 23-6 
165 Brodie, 1959, p. 332 
166 Quoted in Ball, 1984, p. 242    
167 Quoted in Ball, 1981, p. 37. Emphasis in original. 
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Therefore, a doctrine of limited war, conventional or nuclear, is essentially self-deterred by 
the prospect of any limited exchange exploding into an all-out war, from which of course 
there can be no victors. 
    
III. CONCLUSION 
What can we gather from the analysis in this chapter? Section I demonstrated that minimum 
deterrent arsenals void the need to balance superior military power. Section II evaluated the 
various critiques of minimum deterrence, and asked whether any of these contending 
approaches vitiated the conclusion of Section I. Each of the cases against minimum 
deterrence, however, was flawed for different reasons. Thus, far from overturning the 
conclusion of Section I, Section II merely reinforces it.       
 Among nuclear-weapon states, any attempt to increase one’s relative power at the 
expense of another’s by means of the application of superior military power would, 
inadvertently or not, lead to mutual assured destruction. It is for this reason that second-strike 
nuclear forces annul the military balancing imperative. The following chapter explores the 
implications of this conclusion for balance-of-power theory.          
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CHAPTER 3: BALANCING AMONG NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES 
 
The conclusions of the preceding chapter are open to misinterpretation. Specifically, they 
could lend support to the belief that nuclear weapons have rendered obsolete balance-of-
power theory in the nuclear age. With second-strike nuclear forces, one could argue, a 
country’s survival is guaranteed.168 And since balancing is a function of the need and desire 
to survive, balance-of-power theory loses its explanatory power in the nuclear age, or at least 
its ability to explain the outcomes of nuclear-armed states’ behaviour. It is the purpose of this 
chapter to prove the falsity of this argument. The following analysis explores why balancing 
behaviour does indeed persist among nuclear-weapon states, and asks what form this 
behaviour takes. In brief, the chapter concludes that balancing dynamics are in full view in the 
post-Cold War era, and are readily explained by balance-of-power theory presently 
constituted. 
Only nine nuclear-weapon states populate the international system today. One may 
therefore argue that nuclear-armed states merely represent the exception to the rule and not 
the rule itself, insofar as international politics is concerned. In other words, international 
politics is mainly a non-nuclearized business. And, as a result, the present study can only be 
of peripheral importance to the study of international relations. This line of reasoning fails to 
appreciate the logic of balance-of-power theory, which is concerned principally with the great 
powers. Of the nine nuclear-weapon states extant today, five are great powers. Among these 
five, the number of possible dyads is calculated by means of the following equation: [n(n-
1)]/2.169 But the ten dyads that obtain among the great powers, it is safe to say, are of greater 
import to balance-of-power theory than are the rest combined. Underscoring this reasoning is 
                                            
168 I argue below that this is not the case because a state’s survival is contingent not only upon military 
invulnerability (which is possible with nuclear arsenals), but also upon economic invulnerability (which is not 
possible).  
169 Waltz, 1979, p. 135 
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the structure of the international system. In neorealism, the structure of the international 
system constrains states from taking certain actions and disposes them toward taking others. 
Such reified language, while convenient, conceals an important question: who or what is 
doing the constraining and disposing? The answer lies simply in the international system’s 
distribution of capabilities: the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they 
must.170 This dynamic is best illustrated in unipolarity: in a world of one, the dominant power 
is checked and balanced by no one. As a consequence, it is largely free to act as it wishes.171 
Thus, a state’s influence on the international scene is in direct proportion to its relative 
power.172 Hence why international politics is mainly a game played by the great powers. 
Because every contemporary great power possesses a nuclear arsenal, the present study is of 
critical relevance to the study of international politics.                 
 
I. THE SOFT BALANCING DEBATE AND ITS FLAW 
The literature dealing with the absence of military balancing among nuclear-weapon states 
has generated the novel concept of ‘soft balancing’ to refer to those non-military means of 
attempting to balance American power since the end of the Cold War. Soft balancing 
subsumes a host of non-military balancing measures; among the more important include: 
balancing through international institutions (in particular the United Nations Security 
Council) and the assembling of diplomatic coalitions more broadly; economic competition; 
regional economic and political integration; and the denial of military basing rights.173 The 
                                            
170 This is a paraphrase of Thucydides.  
171 Waltz, 2004, p. 4 
172 This reasoning is elaborated in Waltz, 1979, p. 72 
173 For the major statements on soft balancing, see Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” 
International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, 2005; T. V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” 
International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, 2005; Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft 
Balancing,” International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, 2005; Kier A. Lieber & Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for 
Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,” International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, 2005; Franz Oswald, 
“Soft Balancing Between Friends: Transforming Transatlantic Relations,” Debatte, vol. 14, no. 2, 2006; Stephen 
Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 
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terms ‘balking’, ‘binding’, ‘opaque balancing’, ‘‘semi’-hard balancing’, and ‘leash slipping’ 
have also been offered, but considerable overlap exists among them.174 I thus refrain from 
using these terms, and henceforth refer solely to ‘soft balancing’.     
 It is important to note that soft balancing is not alien to balance-of-power theory. 
Because balancing has throughout the ages been most prominent in the military sphere, soft 
balancing is sometimes, incorrectly, believed to lie beyond the scope of balance-of-power 
theory.175 On the whole, however, soft balancing theorists have framed their arguments within 
Waltzian neorealism. To be sure, the soft balancing literature was spawned by the attempt to 
reconcile balance-of-power theory with the dilemma noted in chapter one: that no military 
balance of power has yet formed to check America’s overweening military capability. 
 Soft-balancing theorists have, it is argued here, betrayed a common mistake. Namely, 
soft balancing has collectively been treated as a means of balancing American military power. 
And yet military balancing, as chapter 2 demonstrated, is meaningless among nuclear-weapon 
states, seeing as no such state can bring its military power to bear upon another’s vital 
interests. Additionally, as the preceding chapter also illustrated, second-strike nuclear forces 
deter even those limited military missions that fall far short of threatening a state’s vital 
interests. Why then are nuclear-armed secondary states believed to be soft balancing 
America’s impotent military superiority? Soft-balancing theorists are right in saying that 
secondary states are soft balancing the United States, but are wrong to suggest that it is 
American military power those states are fearful of. It would appear, then, that soft balancing 
is in need of a reformulation. Specifically, soft balancing ought to be conceived not as a 
means of constraining American military power, but as a means of checking American 
                                                                                                                                        
2005, especially ch. 3; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the 
Present, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2006, especially ch. 7. Henceforth Layne, 2006(i).    
174 I thus refrain from using these terms, and instead refer solely to ‘soft balancing’ broadly conceived. This shall 
avoid unnecessary confusion. The terms are defined and elaborated in Walt, 2005, ch. 3; Layne, 2006(i), ch. 7; 
Layne, 2006, pp. 29-36.   
175 Paul, for one, seems to think so. Paul, 2005, p. 71 
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economic and technological preponderance. This latter preponderance, after all, is not a 
condition in which second-tier major powers want to voluntarily acquiesce. Waltz captures 
the balancing logic in non-military realms: “Balance-of-power theory leads one to expect that 
states, if they are free to do so, will flock to the weaker side. The stronger, not the weaker 
side, threatens them, if only by pressing its preferred policies on other states.”176 The various 
dimensions of non-military power – especially economic and technological – can be 
employed in ways that simultaneously advance a state’s national aims without inviting 
nuclear retaliation. Hence the need for states to concern themselves with the balance of 
economic and technological power. 
Avowedly, such balancing behaviour begs the question: if nuclear-armed states are 
capable of deterring any significant military attack upon its vital and lesser interests, why 
does economic and technological competition among them nonetheless persist? Is not 
balancing after all a function of the survival imperative? Worded differently, do not states 
balance superior power so as to reduce their own vulnerability to attacks that could well 
threaten their very survival? The answer would seem to be clear: if states continue to balance 
non-military power, despite their being possessed of retaliatory nuclear forces, then states 
must be aware that their survival is not contingent solely upon remaining militarily 
invulnerable (for which nuclear arsenals are a sure guarantee). Consider, for instance, Aaron 
Friedberg’s 1991 description of economic balancing behaviour in international politics, which 
can stand for a host of other similar statements:   
In the past, nations have often used economic instruments as a way of attempting to influence the 
political behavior of their rivals…. Such practices could become more common in the years ahead, as 
interdependence intensifies, political relationships shift, and the utility of military power in most 
situations remains relatively low. National security policy may, therefore, come to encompass measures 
designed to reduce a country's vulnerability to economic influence attempts (and, perhaps, to enhance 
its capacity for exploiting the vulnerabilities of others)…177 
 
                                            
176 Quoted in Waltz, 1993, p. 72. My emphasis. Stephen Walt makes a similar point in “Taming American 
Power,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 5, 2005, online edition. 
177 Quoted in Aaron Friedberg, “The Changing Relationship between Economics and National Security,” 
Political Science Quarterly, vol. 106, no. 2, 1991, pp. 271-72. My emphasis.   
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Friedberg’s analysis of “economic statecraft” falls short in that it nowhere questions the 
purpose of economic competition in the nuclear age.178 To say that states traditionally 
compete for power and plenty is, after all, perfectly consonant with the notion of military 
balancing. Namely, states compete economically for the simple reason that economic power is 
merely latent military power.179 But as should be clear by now, those nuclear-weapon states 
that have grasped the conclusions of chapter 2 have little or no incentive to balance superior 
military power. For this reason, the argument that economic competition is motivated by the 
prospect of gains in latent military power rings hollow in the nuclear age. Surely, then, 
economic competition must be geared toward other objectives. It is toward these other 
objectives that the analysis now turns.    
 
II. ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY AND STATE SURVIVAL: EVIDENCE OF A 
CAUSAL CONNECTION 
That militarily invulnerable states (ie nuclear-weapon states) balance non-military power 
suggests quite forcefully that state survival can be undermined by non-military means. At 
least, this much was established in the preceding section. The present section therefore 
explores all those non-military means by which a state’s prospects of survival can be 
jeopardised. Toward this end, students of transnational security issues have shed considerable 
light. The numerous non-military threats to state survival extant in the post-Cold War era can 
be categorized as follows: (1) economic; (2) technological; (3) disease and international 
pandemics; and (4) global environmental degradation and climate change.180 These four 
groupings are addressed in turn.  
                                            
178 Quoted in ibid, 1991, p. 271 
179 Cf Mearsheimer, 2001, ch. 3 for a detailed discussion of this concept. 
180 I have compiled this categorization from the following surveys and analyses of transnational security issues in 
the post-Cold War era: Paul Smith, “Transnational Security Threats and State Survival: A Role for the 
Military?,” Parameters, vol. 30, no. 3, 2000; Alan Dupont, “New Dimensions of Security,” in Denny Roy, ed., 
The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region, Macmillan, London, 1997; James Sperling and Emil 
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Economic threats are: 
both diffuse and systemic; they may be unintended or a secondary consequence of state action. 
Nonetheless, the consequences of macroeconomic malfeasance by a major economic power, the 
collapse of financial markets triggered by a major debt repudiation, a generalized hyperinflation, or a 
collapse of currency markets could, singularly or in combination, threaten the very survival of the 
state181  
 
In addition to these, Dupont enumerates still more potential sources of threat:  
The fundamental point is that economic threats to security in the form of disruptions to global 
commerce and financial transactions, economic coercion, trade sanctions, protectionism, resource 
disputes and arguments over market share and market access constitute a whole range of relatively new 
threats to security which may be just as serious and pervasive as traditional politico-military threats.182  
 
Given that economic power can be employed in so many ways, and given the wide-ranging 
nature of the threats it generates, states can wield the economic weapon with considerable 
discrimination and control. Admittedly, a state is unlikely to prosecute those economic attacks 
that threaten another state’s survival in an unequivocal manner. For instance, an embargo 
against a nuclear-weapon state, which at once threatened the latter’s vital interests would be 
akin to launching upon it a nuclear first strike; both cases would doubtless invite nuclear 
retaliation. Thus, an important proviso is in order. A state’s range of usable economic 
instruments therefore extends only to those that could be employed without unambiguously 
jeopardising a nuclear-armed state’s manifestly vital interests. Translated in practical terms, 
nuclear-weapon states can only threaten each other’s survival over the medium- and long-
term.        
Properly understood, technological power is a prerequisite for economic power.183 On 
its own, technological power can do very little in way of harming a state’s vital interests. A 
recent exception may be cyberwarfare, with which Russia experimented in May 2007 when it 
                                                                                                                                        
Kirchner, “Economic Security and the Problem of Cooperation in Post-Cold War Europe,” Review of 
International Studies, vol. 24, 1998. 
181 Quoted in Sperling and Kirchner, 1998, p. 230 
182 Dupont, 1997, p. 36 
183 Sperling and Kirchner, 1998, pp. 224-25; Edward Luttwak, “Power Relations in the New Economy,” 
Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, 2002, p. 10; Friedberg, 1991, p. 275. When the level of technology is equivalent between 
states, more populous countries will generate greater output. Technologically superior countries, however, will 
need less population to produce the same output. 
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delivered a ‘distributed denial of service’ (DDOS) attack on Estonia after the latter provoked 
a diplomatic row with Moscow when it removed the Bronze Solider (a Soviet-era war 
memorial) from its capital Tallinn. This DDOS internet-levelled attack affected over one 
million computers, and temporarily paralysed Estonian telecommunications services and 
government, financial, and media websites.184 Nevertheless, it remains inconceivable that a 
state could marshal this technology in a manner that threatened a nuclear-weapon state’s vital 
interests; at least, not without incurring devastating nuclear retaliation. Technology is a 
fungible asset that can readily be channelled down various avenues of state power.  Hence, as 
James Sperling and Emil Kirchner note, the very “source” of economic power “is dominance 
of the technological frontier”.185  
 Only in the worst-case scenario can diseases and international pandemics threaten the 
survival of the state.186 For instance, one need only witness the devastating effects of the 
AIDS epidemic in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Admittedly, were this epidemic to endanger 
state survival, it would do so chiefly by undermining the economic foundations of the state.187 
That is, the large-scale loss of life would adversely affect a state’s labour force, without which 
a state cannot remain politically viable. In any case, it is all but impossible for a state to wield 
this category of threats in any meaningful way. Perhaps a country could infect a nuclear-
weapon state’s population with a lethal pandemic, but the ramifications of such an act come 
dangerously close to those associated with the radiation effects of nuclear weapons. Namely, 
it would provide sufficient justification for destroying the attacker’s cities that are held 
hostage by the victim state’s second-strike nuclear forces.  
                                            
184 The Economist, “Cyberwarfare: Newly Nasty,” The Economist, May 26th-June 1st, 2007, p. 61  
185 Quoted in Sperling and Kirchner, 1998, p. 225       
186 Smith, 2000, p. 85 
187 Ibid, 2000, p. 85 
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 Global environmental degradation and climate change currently pose a plausible threat 
to state survival in only one way: rising sea levels.188 Indeed, for several South Pacific states, 
such a prospect constitutes their primary national security threat.189 Still, this potentiality is 
limited specifically to small island states or to countries with maritime borders, none of which 
are nuclear-armed great powers (the focus of the present study). Thus, it is of little relevance 
to my argument. Moreover, it would be ludicrous to assume that a state can effectively wield 
the threat of rising sea levels to endanger another’s survival.                 
 In sum, the above dissection of possible non-military threats to state survival yields an 
important conclusion: a nuclear-weapon state’s survival can be intentionally jeopardised only 
by economic means. Technological power, as stated earlier, is merely an adjunct and 
facilitator of economic power. Importantly for balance-of-power theory in the nuclear age, 
this analysis would suggest that, among nuclear-weapon states, balancing – as a function of 
the survival imperative – manifests itself largely in the economic dimension of international 
politics. Thus far, the discussion has been entirely theoretical. A brief consideration of an 
important empirical corroboration of this finding is documented below. 
 An extensive debate exists as to why the Soviet state collapsed, and there are no signs 
of any imminent agreement. Rather, three broad schools of thought constitute the debate: (1) 
the economic implosion thesis; (2) the triumphalist (or vindicationist) explanation; and (3) the 
‘Gorbachev as Great Man’ explanation.190 It is with the first approach that we are here 
concerned. Indeed, this school of thought stresses that the Soviet state’s collapse had a 
                                            
188 Ibid, 2000, p. 86 
189 Ibid, 2000, p. 86 
190 For the first school, refer to the following footnotes on the collapse of the USSR. For the second school, see 
Paul Wolfowitz’s review essay, “How the West Won,” National Review, September 6, 1993; Vladislav Zubok, 
“Why Did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of ‘The Turn’,” in Odd Westad, ed., Reviewing the Cold 
War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, Frank Cass, London, 2000, p. 355. For the third school, see Richard 
Herrmann & Richard Ned Lebow, “What Was the Cold War? When and Why Did it End?” in Richard Herrmann 
& Richard Ned Lebow, eds., Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International 
Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 16; Archie Brown, “Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War,” in 
Richard Herrmann & Richard Ned Lebow, eds., Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study 
of International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Mark Kramer, “The Role of the CPSU International 
Department In Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy,” Soviet Studies, vol. 42, no. 3, July 1990. 
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dominant economic element. If it can be shown that this economic element reflected the 
relative distribution of economic capabilities internationally, my argument will be validated to 
a certain extent. The evidence, keeping in mind its easy manipulation, is nonetheless 
promising. Thus, we find Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev remarking in May 1986 that “the 
Soviet Union is ‘surrounded not by invincible armies but by superior economies.’”191 Celeste 
Wallander hits the nail on its head when she argues that the West “did contribute to the 
decline of the Soviet Union in limited and specific ways and thereby played a role in the 
state’s collapse.”192 The West’s successful exclusion of the Soviet Union from the 
international economic system aggravated the USSR’s internal economic problems, low 
factor productivity being the most prominent among the latter.193 But Wallander stresses that 
even with these important structural problems afflicting the Soviet economy, the latter “was 
not in danger of grinding to a halt”, thus affirming the primacy of international causes over 
domestic ones.194 Wohlforth, reaffirming this causal primacy, recounts the dire economic 
situation Gorbachev found himself in at the end of 1989, when “NATO held a long list of 
trade restrictions against the Warsaw Pact and a European Community was on the verge of a 
new wave of exclusionary economic integration.”195  
Even those inclined to assign the blame for the Soviet Union’s collapse to 
Gorbachev’s reforms – his ‘perestroika’ and ‘glasnost’ policies of economic restructuring and 
political liberalization respectively – overlook the very motivation for those reforms. And yet 
Russell Bova argues that Gorbachev’s policies, which indeed precipitated the unravelling of 
the Soviet Union, were motivated more by external concerns than they were by internal 
                                            
191 Quoted in Waltz, 1993, p. 57 
192 Quoted in Celeste Wallander, “Western Policy and the Demise of the Soviet Union,” Journal of Cold War 
Studies, vol. 5, no. 4, 2003, p. 137. First emphasis in original.  
193 Ibid, 2003, pp. 144 & 146-147 
194 Quoted in ibid, 2003, p. 148 
195 Quoted in William Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-
Jones, & Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 34 
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ones.196 Gorbachev believed that for the Soviet Union to retain its position in international 
politics, Moscow had to adjust to the evolving global economic climate. He believed his 
reforms would be a significant step in this direction, but did not anticipate their actual 
effects.197 At bottom, econo-centric explanations of the dissolution of the Soviet Union hold 
considerable merit, and seem to fit much better with the facts than do alternative hypotheses.                 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
What then are the implications of the findings presented in this chapter? The discussion above 
posits that balancing among nuclear-weapon states is voided at the military level, and is 
instead channelled into the economic dimension of international politics. This therefore 
implies that the relative-gains problem is shifted away from the military arena and into the 
economic one. Indeed, studies by realists in the field of international political economy stress 
that relative-gains seeking is prominent in the economic relations of states.198 But they 
nowhere argue that this obtains because relative-gains seeking at the military level is rendered 
altogether unnecessary by second-strike nuclear arsenals. Nor do these studies posit, as I do 
here, that this concern for relative economic gains is a direct function of the fact that a state’s 
survival can be intentionally undermined economically. Consider, as example, Peter 
Liberman’s study of relative economic gains. He asserts unequivocally: “The most basic 
condition affecting a state’s sensitivity to relative gains is the degree of military threat posed 
by its rival/partner.”199 He adds that “[w]hen war is improbable, states worry less about shifts 
in relative power”.200 To him, “nuclear deterrence has dampened the military significance of 
                                            
196 This case is advanced in Russell Bova, “The Soviet Economy and International Politics,” in Michael Ellman 
and Vladimir Kontorovich, eds., The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System, Routledge, London, 1992. 
197 Ibid, 1992, p. 52 
198 See for instance Michael Mastanduno, “Do Relative Gains Matter? America’s Response to Japanese 
Industrial Policy, in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, Columbia 
University Press, 1993, esp. pp. 256-7; Grieco, 1993 
199 Quoted in Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,” International 
Security, vol. 21, no. 1, 1996, p. 151 
200 Quoted in ibid, 1996, p. 151 
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economic advantage and mitigated the security component of the relative-gains problem”.201 
How, in this last quote, can the second clause follow from the first when a state’s survival can 
be threatened economically? Simply put, nuclear deterrence does not guarantee state survival, 
as the case of the Soviet Union demonstrated all too well.   
 Whereas nuclear weapons are a sure guarantee of a state’s military 
invulnerability, no such remedy exists for economic vulnerability. Hence, if my argument is 
valid, balances of economic power should be a recurrent feature of international politics in the 
nuclear age. The urgency with which they form, however, should be greatly reduced, seeing 
as stakes are higher in security affairs than they are in economic ones; a state’s survival is 
more promptly threatened militarily (in a conventional world only) than it is economically.202 
But the fact that a Cold War superpower can fall by the wayside as a result of relatively 
insufficient economic power can only reinforce in other nuclear-weapon states the need to 
balance superior economic power for reasons of security. Finally, if the analysis presented in 
this chapter is right, one would expect a balance of economic power to form in the post-Cold 
War era, or at least economic balancing behaviour on the part of secondary powers. After all, 
the United States remains today unchallenged as the pre-eminent economic power. It now 
remains to evaluate my argument against the empirical record, a naturally difficult and 
essentially inconclusive enterprise. But for lack of a better means by which to test theories in 
an empirical science such as international relations, an empirical evaluation is in order. 
 
                                            
201 Quoted in ibid, 1996, p. 175 
202 Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” in David A. Baldwin, ed., 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 75 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION – AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION 
 
The hypothesis formulated thus far stands as follows: in the unipolar post-Cold War era 
defined by the military, economic, and political preponderance of the U.S., secondary states 
possessed of second-strike nuclear arsenals refrain from balancing superior American 
conventional and nuclear military power and instead channel their balancing efforts primarily 
into the economic dimension of international politics. This they do because their survival is 
not merely contingent upon remaining militarily invulnerable, but also economically 
invulnerable. And while deterrent strategies make possible the former, there is no conceivable 
means of fulfilling the latter other than to accumulate an appropriate amount of economic 
potential relative to others; enough to stave off economic bullying without engendering 
counterbalancing actions on the part of others. It remains now to evaluate this hypothesis in 
accordance with philosophy-of-science standards, as any scientific hypothesis should, lest 
contrary evidence is prematurely accepted as a refutation of my argument. 
 
I. IS AMERICAN MILITARY POWER BEING BALANCED?  
A cursory glance at the empirical record is now in order. The focus is on the secondary 
nuclear-armed powers: China, Russia, France and Britain. 
In a speech delivered to the United Nations General Assembly in 2003, former 
Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing stated: “China is of the view that the future well-being 
of mankind hinges on … world multi-polarization.”203 And yet, Beijing’s hopes for a 
balanced world do not seem to extend to the military dimension of international politics, 
given that it has until recently largely refrained from military balancing behaviour in the post-
                                            
203 Li Zhaoxing, “Statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing at General Debate of the 58th Session of 
the UN General Assembly,” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office 
at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, http://www.china-
un.ch/eng/ljzg/zgwjzc/t85895.htm, accessed October 2007  
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Cold War era. China has since 1964 pursued a strategy of minimum deterrence. Recent 
figures estimate China’s nuclear arsenal at approximately 145 deployed nuclear warheads, in 
stark contrast to the American arsenal, which currently stands at 4552 deployed nuclear 
warheads.204 China remains without a sophisticated blue water navy, and its aerial and 
maritime power-projection capabilities remain limited. Economically, however, China and the 
U.S. are fiercely competitive. Yuan-Kang Wang argues that Beijing’s balancing behaviour is 
primarily of an economic nature. Even in the face of American military superiority, he 
stresses, “China’s grand strategy takes economic development as its primary goal”.205 The 
U.S. Congress has expressed discontent at China’s relatively lenient labour and environmental 
standards. The Chinese government insists it cannot effectively monitor adherence to these 
standards, but few fail to appreciate that China lacks the will to enforce compliance, 
especially when violating such standards generates economic gains relative to the U.S. 
Moreover, Congress has charged China of counterfeiting American goods, but to no avail.206 
As the world’s fastest growing economy, China no doubt understands that greater economic 
growth means greater prospects of survival. 
Article 1 of the 1997 ‘Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and 
the Establishment of a New International Order’ states: “the Parties shall strive to promote the 
multipolarization of the world”.207 This objective notwithstanding, Russia seems little 
concerned with American military unipolarity. Indeed, Moscow has undertaken reductions in 
all three legs of its strategic triad between 1991 and 2005, and further reductions are 
                                            
204 The estimate of China’s deployed warheads is valid for November 2006. Hans Kristensen, Robert Norris, and 
Matthew McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning, Federation of American Scientists 
and Natural Resources Defense Council, November 2006, p. 202. The U.S. figure is valid for January 2007. 
Current U.S. Nuclear Forces, The Nuclear Weapon Archive, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Nukeforce.html, accessed April 2007 
205 Quoted in Yuan-Kang Wang, “China’s Grand Strategy and U.S. Primacy: Is China Balancing American 
Power?” Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, July 2006, p. 16 
206 I am grateful to Marc Lombard, Department of Economics, Macquarie University, for these points. 
207 Declaration text, “Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New 
International Order,” http://www.fas.org/news/russia/1997/a52--153en.htm, accessed October 2007  
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planned.208 These data are telling given Washington’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001. Although Russian defence spending has increased “slightly” 
since 2001, this has had more to do with the secessionist dispute over Chechnya than with 
American military power.209 
France and the United Kingdom have both pursued strategies of minimum deterrence 
since 1960 and 1952 respectively.210 Former French President Jacques Chirac often voiced his 
fondness for multipolarity, and yet took no significant steps to balance American military 
power.211 French and British nuclear arsenals have remained relatively constant for decades, 
and have not exceeded several hundred nuclear weapons each. On both sides of the Channel, 
military spending since the last years of the Cold War has decreased markedly. In 2002, 
France spent on defence barely 64% as much as it did in 1985. Remarkably, Britain spent on 
defence in 2002 less than 47% what it did in 1985.212 On the economic front, however, both 
are members of the European Union. And between the EU and the U.S., economic tensions 
abound.213 Consider, for example, the heated competition between American-owned Boeing 
and the Airbus consortium comprised of France, Germany, Britain, and Spain; the EU’s ban 
on hormone-fed beef; and the EU’s opposition to genetically modified (GM) food. The 
Boeing-Airbus contest, the primary economic dispute between the EU and the U.S., has been 
particularly intense over the issue of ‘launch aid’. Specifically, the U.S. opposes the provision 
of forgivable loans to Airbus by certain European governments, citing unfair competition.214 
                                            
208 See Pavel Podvig, The Russian Nuclear Arsenal, International Relations and Security Network, Zurich, 
March 1, 2006  
209 Lieber and Alexander, 2005, p. 121 
210 For a detailed account of France’s minimum deterrent posture, officially ‘proportional deterrence’, see David 
Yost, “French Nuclear Targeting,” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986, pp. 127-156. For a detailed account of Britain’s minimum deterrent 
posture, see Lawrence Freedman, “British Nuclear Targeting,” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., 
Strategic Nuclear Targeting, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986, pp. 109-126 
211 On Chirac’s fondness for multipolarity, see Marcel Herpen, “France: Champion of a Multipolar World,” In 
the National Interest, May 14, 2003, online version 
212 Calculated from Lieber and Alexander, 2005, p. 118. 
213 I am grateful to Marc Lombard, Department of Economics, Macquarie University, for the following points. 
214 Timothy Carney, “Boeing vs. Airbus: Clash of the Corporate Welfare Titans,” Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, July 14, 2005, online version   
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On both sides, the government intervenes in the market by means of subsidies, ‘soft loans’ (ie 
loans with low interest rates), tax cuts, and tax credits, and outright financial grants. At issue 
in this dispute is greater market share of the lucrative commercial aviation industry. 
Reflecting the dynamics of relative-gains seeking, Timothy Carney contends that “Europeans 
… seem willing to lose money in helping Airbus, as part of the cost of beating the U.S.”215 
Given the stakes involved, and given the fact that both companies contribute importantly to 
their respective home economies, government involvement in the dispute is to be expected. 
The disputes over beef and GM food are supposedly predicated upon health concerns, but few 
fail to see the deeper economic competition that underlies this rhetoric.   
Strikingly, this evidence is set against a backdrop of rising American military power. 
Since 2001, the U.S. “has carried out a formidable military buildup”.216 Clearly, the nuclear-
armed secondary powers worry little about American military power. 
 
II. RECALCITRANT ‘FACTS’  
Theories hold across all space and time; their applications are infinite. And yet only a finite 
amount of evidence can ever be gathered in support of a theory. Thus, all theories are 
underdetermined by the ‘facts’. This consequently begs the question: how many white swans 
must one observe to ‘corroborate’ (not confirm) the hypothesis that all swans are white? The 
question is rhetorical. Surely, then, there must be more to evaluating an hypothesis than 
amassing facts in its support. Many more facts could have been adduced in Section I, and yet 
little more would have been gained in the process. More emphasis should thus be accorded 
the qualitative aspects of corroboration. And toward this end, ‘hard’ tests are particularly 
effective. How then does my argument fare when confronted with such a test? I have claimed 
that states, for purposes of security, actively intervene in the economy to further the pursuit of 
                                            
215 Quoted in ibid, 2005, online version. 
216 Lieber and Alexander, 2005, p. 121 
 56
HONOURS THESIS  Alex Lombard  
relative economic gains. To be sure, such behaviour conflicts with the laissez-faire economic 
platforms of certain governments. Therefore, if even these governments behave as I predict, 
my argument would be validated to a certain degree. As members of the moderately liberal 
(non-interventionist) UMP party, one wonders whether Jacques Chirac and his successor, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, abstain(ed) from the type of intervention my argument predicts. French 
industrial policy, however, has not shied from intervening in the economy, especially when 
relative economic gains were at stake. In 2005, the then prime minister, Dominique de 
Villepin (UMP), following a failed attempt by American-owned PepsiCo to take over the 
French food giant Danone, outlined “a list of strategic industries that would remain forever in 
French hands”.217 In relation to Boeing-Airbus subsidies, Washington outspends the 
European governments combined by a ratio of ten to one.218 Situations such as these remind 
secondary powers of the risks of leaving U.S. economic power unchecked, and thus 
encourage interventionist industrial practices. Hence France’s dilemma, which is succinctly 
captured by The Economist: “The trouble with moving from interventionist industrial policy 
to a hands-off, liberal approach is that you have to intervene, and get your hands dirty, to get 
from here to there.”219 Much the same way that the survival motive impels civilian leaders to 
intervene in military policy220, the survival imperative sometimes occasions governments to 
intervene in the economy, even though the latter is often largely held in private hands.  
                                           
 The indeterminacy of neorealist theory further complicates any attempt at falsifying 
my argument. Because systems-level causes do not determine state behaviour in neorealism, 
any discordant fact can be ‘explained away’ by invoking unit-level forces. Must one take 
Beijing’s announcement in March 2007 of a 17.8% increase in its defence budget as a 
refutation of my argument? Hardly, since neorealist theory merely argues that the structure of 
 
217 Quoted in The Economist, “French Industry Policy: Getting Better?” The Economist, July 14, 2007, p. 67 
218 The Economist, “Airbus: Happy landing?” The Economist, June 23, 2007, p. 67 
219 Quoted in The Economist, 14/7/07, p. 68 
220 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1984 
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the international system constrains the range of possible state behaviours, and does not dictate 
to states which behaviours to follow. Because second-strike forces render void the need to 
balance superior military power, China’s seeming decision to initiate larger military balancing 
efforts against the U.S. could scarcely have been induced by the structure of the international 
system. Rather, unit-level factors (eg Beijing’s belief that military superiority matters in the 
nuclear age) better explain this decision. China’s recent intentions to expand its nuclear 
arsenal are similarly explained. Perhaps Beijing, concerned with the increasing accuracy of 
U.S. strategic forces (which was a stated objective of the classified U.S. Nuclear Posture 
Review of 2002), wishes to fashion a limited nuclear war-fighting capability, which naturally 
involves significant military investment, and would thus constitute military balancing. The 
argument presented herein argues that nuclear-armed states refrain from military balancing 
because they understand the conclusions reached in chapter 2. But one does not intuit the fact 
that a limited nuclear war, local or central, cannot be controlled; one learns it. And state 
learning is a unit-level force. To say that my argument is flawed by the fact that China 
believes a limited nuclear war can be controlled is akin to saying that balance-of-power theory 
is flawed by the fact that Hitler believed he could transcend the constraints of the international 
system in his attempt to conquer Europe. Systemic constraints are there for all to see, and 
while states usually perceive and act upon them in similar ways, this is not always the case.      
 
IV. GAUGING THE STRENGTH OF THE UNIT-LEVEL CHALLENGE 
Military balancing among nuclear-weapon states, while uncommon, has its roots in unit-level 
causes: namely, in the perception that minimum deterrence does not suffice to stave off 
structural dispositions to balance superior military power. During the Cold War, for example, 
minimum deterrence held little sway in both Washington and Moscow.221 Soviet Premier 
                                            
221 For an incisive account of Washington’s disdain for minimum deterrence during the years 1945-1960, see 
David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” 
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Nikita Khrushchev (1958-1964) did attempt, however, to pursue a strategy of minimum 
deterrence. In part a result of this, he lost his post, as many of his Politburo colleagues 
eschewed minimum deterrence, and placed their faith instead in nuclear superiority.222 In 
Soviet-American relations, it is safe to say, the history of minimum deterrence is a history of 
poverty. This aberration notwithstanding, every other nuclear-weapon state has indeed 
pursued a strategy of minimum deterrence.223 As chapter 2 demonstrated, minimum deterrent 
arsenals are in fact sufficient to ward off the military balancing imperative. 
If the argument presented in this thesis is correct, and if it is indeed true that state 
survival is contingent not only upon military, but also economic, invulnerability, then the 
unit-level challenge (ie second-strike nuclear forces) to balance-of-power theory will be 
feeble indeed. Because states lack the means to ensure economic invulnerability, nuclear-
weapon states are condemned to balance superior economic power. Hence, to paraphrase that 
old adage, the foregoing analysis would appear to suggest that even among nuclear-weapon 
states, it is balance-of-power politics as usual.   
 
                                                                                                                                        
International Security, vol. 7, no. 4, 1983. Rosenberg relies primarily on recently (at the time of publication) 
declassified primary source material. And for the years 1960-1983, see Desmond Ball’s thorough analysis of the 
evolution of the U.S. single integrated operational plan (SIOP), in accordance with which a U.S. nuclear attack 
would proceed in the event of a crisis. Ball, 1986, pp. 57-83. Ball also relies heavily on primary sources. 
Regarding the Soviet Union’s counterforce-oriented nuclear doctrine, see William Lee, “Soviet Nuclear 
Targeting Strategy,” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1986, pp. 84-108. 
222 Mike Bowker and Phil Williams, Superpower Detente: A Reappraisal, SAGE Publications, London, 1988, p. 
37   
223 It is questionable, however, whether India and Pakistan are genuinely committed to the strategy’s logic or 
whether they are financially constrained into pursuing minimum deterrence, a relatively cheaper deterrent 
strategy.  
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